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Abstract
We prove that the observational equivalence of third-order finitary (i.e. recursion-free) Idealized
Algol (IA) is decidable using Game Semantics. By modelling the state explicitly in our games, we
show that the denotation of a term M of this fragment of IA is a compactly innocent strategy-
with-state, i.e. the strategy is generated by a finite view function fM . Given any such fM , we
construct a real-time deterministic pushdown automaton (DPDA) that recognizes the complete plays
of the knowing-strategy denotation of M . Since such plays characterize observational equivalence,
and there is an algorithm for deciding whether any two DPDAs recognize the same language, we
obtain a procedure for deciding the observational equivalence of third-order finitary IA. Restricted to
second-order terms, the DPDA representation cuts down to a deterministic finite automaton; thus our
approach gives a new proof of Ghica and McCusker’s regular-expression characterization for this
fragment. Our algorithmic representation of program meanings, which is compositional, provides
a foundation for model-checking a wide range of behavioural properties of IA and other cognate
programming languages. Another result concerns second-order IA with full recursion: we show that
observational equivalence for this fragment is undecidable.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Algorithmic Game Semantics
Game Semantics has emerged as a powerful paradigm for giving semantics to a
variety of programming languages and logical systems. It has been used to construct the
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first syntax-independent fully abstract models for a spectrum of programming languages
ranging from purely functional languages to languages with non-functional features such
as control operators and locally scoped references [2–4,13,16]. In the game reading, types
(specifications) are interpreted as games, and programs (implementations) as strategies on
games. Game Semantics captures the quantitative and algorithmic aspects of a computation
typical of Operational Semantics, while admitting compositional methods in the style of
Denotational Semantics: it provides a very concrete way of building fully abstract models.
This paper concerns a recent development of Game Semantics in a new, algorithmic
direction, with a view to applications in computer-assisted verification and program
analysis. The important first steps have been taken by Ghica and McCusker [9]; they
show that the second-order finitary (i.e. recursion-free) fragment of the fully abstract game
semantics of Reynolds’ language, Idealized Algol (IA), can be represented in a remarkably
simple form by regular expressions. This yields a procedure for deciding the observational
equivalence for this fragment.
The promise of this approach is to transfer the methods of Model Checking (see
e.g. [5]) based on automata-theoretic representations, which has been so successful in the
analysis of hardware designs and communications and security protocols, to the much
more structured setting of programming languages, in which data types and control flow
are important.
1.2. Overview
A notable feature of Abramsky and McCusker’s fully abstract knowing (or history-
sensitive) strategy game semantics [4] for IA is the implicit nature of its model of state.
Knowing strategies that denote finitary IA terms are in general infinite sets of justified
sequences (i.e. sequences of moves, each of which is equipped with a justification pointer to
an earlier move) of a certain kind. For games of up to second order, such pointers can safely
be ignored (because they are uniquely reconstructible), so justified sequences may simply
be represented as words over an alphabet of moves. Recently Ghica and McCusker [9]
have shown that knowing strategies that denote terms of second-order finitary IA can be
represented, compositionally, as regular expressions. Can the approach be extended to
higher orders? We show that using a scheme based on view offsets, justified sequences
can be encoded as words over an appropriate alphabet. We then show that, in general,
complete plays (i.e. plays in which every question is answered) of knowing strategies that
denote terms of the third-order fragment of IA are not regular (Lemma 30).
What automata-theoretic formalism then is needed to characterize (the game semantics
of) third-order finitary IA? Our approach to the question is via a more intensional version
of game semantics that models state explicitly: we attach a state (i.e. a finite function
from locations to data values) to each move of the play. Intuitively the locations that are
defined at a move correspond to the assignable variables that have been declared (but not
yet deallocated) thus far in the history of the computation. As these variables are local (to
the block in which they are allocated), their contents can only be changed by the assignment
commands that are in scope, i.e. within the same allocating block in the program being
modelled (P’s perspective), and not directly by any assignment command of the program
context (O’s perspective). This translates to a basic principle governing state: only P can
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change state, either by updating the contents at locations introduced by earlier P-moves
which are currently P-visible (i.e. appearing in the P-view of the history of play), or by
introducing new locations. The key point is that, for games of up to third order, we may take
this innocent view of states further by considering as relevant only those locations that have
been introduced by earlier P-moves which are currently P-visible. This has the important
effect of constraining the growth of states (attached to moves in a play) as the game unfolds.
We show that [[Γ  M : A]], the strategy-with-state that denotes a third-order IA term-
in-context, is compactly innocent in the sense (of [13]) that the strategy is generated by a
finite view function fM . Moreover [[Γ  M : A]] is closely related to the knowing-strategy
denotation, written [[Γ  M : A]]κ : we prove in Theorem 25 that
erase [[Γ  M : A]] = [[Γ  M : A]]κ;
i.e. the knowing-strategy denotation may be recovered by erasing states from (each play
of) the innocent strategy-with-state denotation. We then give a general construction that
takes any such finite view function fM and produces a real-time (i.e. no -transition)
deterministic pushdown automaton (DPDA) P fM . The control states of P fM are the
P-views that define fM ; its input alphabet is the set of moves (without state) of the arena,
augmented by certain symbols for the purpose of encoding pointers. Writing L(P fM ) for
the language recognized by P fM , we then prove a major technical result (Theorem 31) of
the paper:
L(P fM ) = cplays [[Γ  M : A]]κ.
In other words, the set of complete plays of the knowing-strategy semantics of third-order
finitary IA is deterministic context-free. This answers the question we posed earlier in the
Overview.
Further since compactly innocent strategies-with-state are effectively compositional
(Theorem 18), the innocent-strategy denotation [[Γ  M : A]], regarded as a map M
→ fM , is effectively computable and, hence, so is the DPDA representation M → P fM .
Finally, thanks to a characterization of observational equivalence (written ≈) in terms of
complete plays in [4]
M ≈ N cplays [[Γ  M : A]]κ = cplays [[Γ  N : A]]κ
we obtain a pleasing application of the DPDA representation:
Theorem 1. For any third-order finitary IA terms-in-contexts Γ  M : A and Γ  N : A
that are constructed from finite base types, we have
M ≈ N L(P fM ) = L(P fN ).
Further, because there is an effective procedure for deciding whether any two DPDAs
recognize the same language, M ≈ N is decidable. 
The DPDA Equivalence Problem
“Is there an effective procedure for deciding whether any two DPDAs recognize the
same language?”
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was first posed in 1966. Although the real-time case was resolved positively by
Oyamaguchi et al. [29] in 1980, the general problem was only solved recently, also
positively, by Se´nizergues [35], who was awarded the ACM SIGACT/EATCS Go¨del Prize
for his accomplishment. Stirling subsequently obtained a considerably simpler proof and
gave a primitive recursive decision procedure [37,38].
Restricted to finitary second-order terms, the DPDA representation cuts down to
a deterministic finite automaton; thus our approach gives a new proof of Ghica and
McCusker’s regular-expression characterization for this fragment. A natural question is
whether the algorithmic representation can be extended to fourth and higher orders. It
turns out that third order is the limit, and the best that we can do.
Another result of the paper concerns second-order IA with recursion (in which fixpoints
of functions of second order are definable). We show that observational equivalence for
this fragment is undecidable (Theorem 38).
1.3. Related work
Perhaps the most important result that we should mention here is Loader’s
undecidability theorem in [18]. He proves that observational equivalence of third-order
finitary PCF is undecidable. It is worth pointing out that observational equivalence of
(active) IA does not1 extend that of PCF conservatively. Recently Murawski [22] has shown
that observational equivalence of fourth-order IA is undecidable.
On the (Algorithmic) Game Semantics front, Ghica has extended his earlier work with
McCusker to a call-by-value language with arrays [8], and to model-checking Hoare-style
program correctness assertions [7]. For a tutorial introduction, we recommend [1].
1.4. Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The syntax and operational semantics
of Idealized Algol are introduced in Section 2. We develop the requisite game-semantic
machinery in Section 3, and give an innocent strategy-with-state interpretation of third-
order IA in Section 4, which also contains a result relating the innocent denotation to
the knowing-strategy semantics. In Section 5, using view offsets to encode justifications
pointers, we show that the innocent denotation of a third-order finitary IA term gives rise to
a DPDA which characterizes the knowing-strategy semantics of the term. As a corollary we
obtain the main decidability results of the paper. In Section 6, we prove that observational
equivalence of second-order IA with recursion is undecidable. We conclude the paper with
a discussion of further directions in Section 7.
Readers who are familiar with the game semantics of Idealized Algol may wish to skip
the next two sections and go straight to Section 4, and return to Section 3 at a later stage
for the new material on game semantics.
An extended abstract of this paper has appeared in the Proceedings of LICS’02 [28].
1 Take the two PCF-terms to be λx : B.if x then x else x and λx : B.x , and the separating context to be
new y := 0 in if [-](y := !y + 1 ; ) then (if !y = 1 then else ).
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2. Idealized Algol
Reynolds’ Idealized Algol (IA for short) [33] is a compact language that elegantly
combines state-based procedural and higher-order functional programming. The basis of
IA is a simply typed call-by-nameλ-calculus in which the standard constructs of imperative
programming and block-allocated assignable variables are definable. In this section, we
review the syntax and operational semantics of IA, introduce the notion of observational
equivalence, and illustrate the richness of the theory (of observational equivalence) with
examples.
2.1. Syntax
We let D range over basic data sets such as N (natural numbers), B (booleans), Z
(integers), and 1 (the singleton set). The base types of IA (ranged over by β) are then
exp[D] | loc[D] | com;
where exp[D] is the type of expressions that have values in D, loc[D] is the type of
locations (or assignable program variables) at which elements of D can be stored, and
com is the type of commands. (In the following we shall use the words location and
assignable variable interchangeably.) The types of IA (ranged over by A, B,C , etc.) are
then defined by the grammar: A ::= β | A ⇒ A. The order of a type A, written order(A),
is defined as follows: for any base type β, order(β) def= 0 (note that both 0 and 1 are used
in the literature); and order(A ⇒ B) def= max(order(A)+ 1, order(B)).
For simplicity, in the rest of the paper (except for Examples 2 and 26) we shall work
with a version of IA that is generated from a single basic data set, namely, N. To save
writing, we shall write exp[N] and loc[N] simply as exp and loc respectively.
Term candidates of IA (ranged over by M, N, P , etc.) are defined as follows:
M ::= x | M M | λx : A.M | Ω | n
| succ | pred | ifzero M then M else M | Y(M)
| l | M := M | !M | mkloc M M
| skip | M ; M | new x := n in M
where x ranges over a countable set of variables, l ranges over a countable set of locations,
and n over natural numbers. The first two lines define the standard PCF constructs [32,
34]. We use infix := for variable assignment, prefix ! for dereferencing, infix ; for com-
mand sequencing, and write skip for the null command. Block-allocated local variables
are introduced by the construct new x := n in M (the local variable x is initialized to
n as control enters the block; note also that x is bound by the new-construct). The bad-
location constructor (or, more commonly, bad-variable constructor) mkloc takes a “read
method” M and a “write method” N and creates a term mkloc M N of type loc. Note that
this version of IA (as opposed to Reynold’s original definition) admits active expressions,
i.e. expressions with side effects such as x : loc  x := !x + 1 ; !x : exp and
f : com ⇒ exp  new z := 0 in ( f (z := !z + 1)+ !z) : exp.
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Fig. 1. Selected rules defining typing judgments.
Using the fixed-point operator, IA can express iterations (e.g. the while-loop while B do C
is definable as Y(λx .if B thenC ; x elseskip)) and recursively defined procedures.
Valid typing judgements of IA of the form Γ  M : A are defined by induction over
a number of rules. We shall give in Fig. 1 only the rules pertaining to the imperative
constructs of IA; rules for the other constructs (which are PCF-constructs) are standard.
Note that in the figure, β ranges over the base types exp and com. Finally we define the
order of a term-in-context x1 : C1, . . . , xn : Cn  M : A to be
max{order(C1)+ 1, . . . , order(Cn)+ 1, order(A)}.
2.2. Operational semantics
Values of IA, ranged over by V , V ′, etc. are values of the base types (namely, numerals,
skip, and locations and mkloc-terms) and λ-abstractions. The operational semantics of IA
is given in terms of an evaluation relation of the form
M, S ⇓ V , S′
where M and V range over closed terms and closed values respectively, and S and S′ range
over states which are finite functions from locations to elements of the basic data sets. The
evaluation relation ⇓ is defined by induction over the set of rules in Fig. 2.
Let M and N be terms such that for some Γ and A, we have Γ  Mi : A is provable for
i = 1 and 2. We define M N (read “M observationally approximates N”) to mean: for
any context C[-] such that C[M] and C[N] are programs (i.e. closed terms of type com in
which there is no occurrence of any location),
C[M],∅ ⇓ skip,∅ C[N],∅ ⇓ skip,∅.
Note that quantification over all program contexts C[-] ensures that all potential side effects
of M and N are taken fully into account. We call observational preorder, and define
M ≈ N (“M and N are observationally equivalent”) to mean M N and N M .
The theory of observational equivalence is rich. We consider a few examples.
Example 2. The following examples illustrate features of IA which have been studied in
the literature.
(i) No “snap back” [25]: This illustrates the consequences for observational equiva-
lence of the inability of IA to “snap back” the state to some previous point in the thread of
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Fig. 2. Rules defining the evaluation relation ⇓.
computation:
p : com ⇒ com
 new x := 0 in p(x := 1) ;if !x = 1 thenΩ elseskip ≈ p(Ω).
(ii) Parametricity [26]: Note that the local variables x and y in the following have types
loc[Z] and loc[B] respectively:
p : com ⇒ exp[B] ⇒ com
 new x := 1 in p (x := −!x) (!x > 0)
≈ new y := in p (y := not y) (!y).
(iii) Consider the following third-order terms [31]:
Ξ1 = λF.new x := 1 in F(λc.x := 0 ;c ; !x)
Ξ2 = λF.new x := 1 in F(λc.x := !x + 1 ;c ; x := !x − 2 ; !x)
Ξ3 = λF.F(λc.c ;0)
of type ((com ⇒ exp)⇒ exp)⇒ exp. We have Ξ1 ≈ Ξ2 and Ξ1 ≈ Ξ3. The reader may
wish to verify Ξ1 ≈ Ξ2 by applying Ξ1 and Ξ2 respectively to
λh.h(ifzero (hskip) thenskip elseΩ).
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Remark 3. In [20] McCusker has adapted the knowing-strategy semantics of IA to give a
characterization of a version of IA without the bad-location constructor mkloc. Using the
model he shows that adding mkloc is conservative for observational equivalence but not
for observational preorder.
3. Game semantics
This section develops the game semantics that underpins the main decidability results.
After a quick review of the basic definitions, we introduce strategies-with-state and a
protocol for updating states that correctly models the scoping of locations (or assignable
variables) for up to order three. We then consider the strategies of this fragment that are
compactly innocent, and prove that they are effectively composable.
3.1. Basic definitions
Definition 4. An arena is a triple A = 〈MA, λA,A〉 where MA is a set of moves;
λA : MA {PQ, PA, OQ, OA}
is a labelling function which, for a given move, indicates which of Proponent (P) and
Opponent (O) may make the move and whether it is a question (Q) or an answer (A); and
A ⊆ (MA ∪ {∗}) × MA , where ∗ is a dummy move (which is not in MA), is called the
justification relation (we read m1 A m2 as “m1 justifies m2”) satisfying the following
axioms: in (3) and (4), we let m and m′ range over MA .
(1) For each m ∈ MA there is a unique x ∈ MA ∪ {∗} such that x A m; in case ∗ A m,
we call m an initial move.
(2) Every initial move is an O-question.
(3) If m A m′ then m and m′ are moves by different players.
(4) If m A m′ then m is a question (“Only questions may justify moves.”).
(5) A (MA × MA) is well-founded.
It is useful to think of the justification relation A (restricted to MA × MA) as defining
the edge-set of a vertex-labelled directed graph whose vertex-set is MA . It follows from
the definition that the graph so defined, which we shall refer to as the arena graph of A,
is a forest (of trees). We call an arena finite just in the case where it has finitely many
moves.
Remark 5. Though our arenas are presented in the style of McCusker [19], they are
exactly those introduced in [13]. In the arenas defined in [4], answer-moves may also justify
moves. This is a level of generality that we do not need. Our arenas are adequate for the
construction of the fully abstract knowing-strategy semantics of Idealized Algol, and in
particular for establishing Theorem 23.
The simplest arena is the empty arena 1 = 〈∅,∅,∅〉. Let A and B be arenas. The
product arena A × B is just the disjoint union of the respective arena graphs of A and B .
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Formally we have
MA×B = MA + MB
λA×B = [λA, λB ]
∗ A×B m ∗ A m ∨ ∗ B m
m A×B n m A n ∨ m B n.
Given an arena A, we write A for the graph that is obtained from the arena graph of A by
inverting the P/O-label at each vertex. As an operation on arena graphs, the function space
arena A ⇒ B is obtained from the arena graph of B by grafting a copy of A just under
each initial move of B . Formally, writing M InitB for the set of initial moves of B , we have
MA⇒B = (MA × M InitB )+ MB
λA⇒B = [π1 ;λA, λB ]
(where P Q, P A, O Q, O A are defined to be O Q, O A, P Q, P A respectively) and A⇒B
⊆ (MA × M InitB + MB + {∗})× (MA × M InitB + MB ) is defined by:
∗ A⇒B b ∗ B b
b A⇒B (a, b′) b = b′ ∧ ∗ A a
(a, b) A⇒B (a′, b′) b = b′ ∧ a A a′
b A⇒B b′ b B b′.
We use square and round parentheses in bold type as meta-variables for moves as
follows:
O-question P-answer P-question O-answer
[ ] ( ).
We define the type-theoretic order (or simply order) of a question-move q , written
order(q), to be 0 if q is initial; otherwise if q A q ′ then order(q ′) = 1 + order(q).
The order of an answer-move is the order of the (unique) question-move that justifies it.
In the following we shall only be concerned with arenas that have finitely many questions.
The order of such an arena is defined to be the order of the question that has the highest
type-theoretic order.
A justified sequence over an arena A is a finite sequence of alternating moves such that,
except the first move which is initial, every move m has a justification pointer (or simply
pointer) to some earlier move m0 such that m0 A m; we say that m is explicitly justified
by m0, or m0 explicitly justifies m. A question in a justified sequence s is said to be pending
just in the case where no answer in s is explicitly justified by it. Recall the definition of the
P-view [13] of a justified sequence s, written s:
s m = sm if m is a P-move
m = m if m is initial
s m0 u m = sm0 m if the O-move m is explicitly justified by m0.
In s m0 u m the pointer from m to m0 is retained, and similarly for the pointer from m in
s m in the case where m is a P-move. The definition of O-view s is obtained from the
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above clauses by swapping P and O. We shall consider justified sequences that satisfy the
following conditions [13]:
• Visibility: Every P-move (respectively non-initial O-move) is explicitly justified by
some move that appears in the P-view (respectively O-view) at that point.
• Well-Bracketing: Every P-answer (respectively O-answer) is an answer to (i.e. explic-
itly justified by) the last pending O-question (respectively P-question).
3.2. State change conditions
We shall consider justified sequences of moves-with-state, and introduce new conditions
of State Change. First some notation. For simplicity we fix N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} as our only
basic data set. A state (ranged over by S, Si , T , etc.) is a finite function from locations
(ranged over by l, l ′, li , etc.) to natural numbers. A move-with-state of an arena A is a pair,
written mS (or just m if S is understood), where m is a move of A and S is a state; we refer
to a location in dom(S) as a location that is defined at m.
Given states S0 and S1, we define the state S0[S1] (read “S0 updated by S1”) as: for each
l ∈ dom(S0[S1]) def= dom(S0),
S0[S1](l) def=
{
S1(l) if l ∈ dom(S1)
S0(l) otherwise.
Note that S[S] = S, for any state S.
Given an arena, we shall consider justified sequences of moves-with-state that satisfy
Visibility, Well-Bracketing, and the following State Change Conditions:
• (SC-P): The locations defined at a P-move mS are those locations defined at the
preceding O-move mS11 (say), and possibly some fresh locations which are said to be
introduced by mS . That is, dom(S1) ⊆ dom(S), and none in dom(S)\dom(S1) has
appeared earlier in the justified sequence.
• (SC-O): The opening move has a null state. Let mS be a non-initial O-move which is
explicitly justified by mS00 , and let mS11 be the move immediately preceding mS . Then
S = S0[S1].
We shall call justified sequences satisfying these conditions plays or legal positions.
We state some straightforward consequences of conditions (SC-P) and (SC-O):
Lemma 6. (i) Every location that is defined at a move is introduced by some P-move that
appears in the P-view at that point.
(ii) The locations defined at a P-move mS include every location that is defined at the
O-move mS00 which explicitly justifies m. That is, dom(S0) ⊆ dom(S). 
In the following, by a P-view, we shall mean a justified sequence that is the P-view of
some legal position; similarly for O-view. The P-view of a legal position is a justified
sequence that satisfies Visibility and Well-Bracketing (see [13]), though not necessarily
State Change.
We need to check that the State Change Conditions correctly model the scoping of
block-allocated local variables. Take a location l introduced by some P-move m in a
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play s m u. We define the thread of l to be the subsequence of the play s m u consisting of
moves at which l is defined (which corresponds to that part of the computation history when
control is in the scope of l). Specifically we aim to verify that it follows from conditions
(SC-P) and (SC-O) that whenever the thread of l is re-entered by O, the contents at l are
set to the value last held in the thread. This is indeed the case for arenas of order at most
three, as Lemma 7 makes precise (but not so at higher orders; see Remark 8). First we state
some structural properties of legal positions of arenas of up to third order.
Observation 1. We assume a third-order arena.
(i) For any legal position of the shape [0 u (1 v [2 that ends with a second-order
O-question [2 which is explicitly justified by (1, we have
[0 u (1 v [2 = [0 (1 a1 b1 · · · an bn [2
where a1 b1 · · · an bn is a subsequence of v such that each ai is a second-order O-question
explicitly justified by (1, and each bi is either a second-order P-answer or a third-order
P-question explicitly justified by ai .
(ii) Take any legal position of the shape u1 [2 u2 (3 u3 such that the third-order question
(3 is explicitly justified by [2. If no move in u3 is explicitly justified by (3 then no move
in u2 can appear in either the P-view or O-view at any move in u3, and no move in u3 is
explicitly justified by any move in u2. 
As the observations are more or less obvious, we omit the proof.
Lemma 7. We assume an arena of order at most three. Let s m0 u m1 m be a legal position
in which the O-move m is explicitly justified by m0. Suppose the location l is defined at m0.
Then either l is defined at m1 or l is not defined at any move in the segment u.
Proof. The move m0 must be a P-question, which is either first-order or third-order. First,
suppose the former.
(1a) In the case where m is an O-answer which is by assumption explicitly justified by
m0, then by Well-Bracketing the segment u m1 must be of the shape [1 w1 ]1 · · · [n wn ]n
(i.e. a sequence of segments, each beginning with an O-question and ending with a P-
answer); and by Visibility each [i is explicitly justified by m0, as follows:
. . .
m0
(1 [1 w1 ]1 · · · [n wn︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
m1]n
m
) .
By condition (SC-O), l is defined at each [i , and since m1 is explicitly justified by [n , l is
defined at m1 according to Lemma 6(ii).
(1b) In the case where m is an O-question, then by Observation 1(i), the segment u m1
must be of the shape [1 w1 b1 [2 w2 b2 · · · [n wn bn where each [i is an O-question which
is explicitly justified by m0, and each bi , which is either a third-order P-question or a
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second-order P-answer, is explicitly justified by [i , and bn = m1, as follows:
· · ·
m0
(1 [1 w1 b1 [2 w2 b2 · · · [n wn︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
m1
bn
m[ .
Since l is defined at m0, it is also defined at [n , which is within u, and hence also at
bn = m1, by Lemma 6(ii).
Now suppose m0 is a third-order P-question. Since the arena is third-order, m must be an
O-answer. By Well-Bracketing, the segment u m1 has the shape [w1 ] · · · [wn ]; further by
Visibility each [ is explicitly justified by some occurrence of a first-order question—call
it (1—which explicitly justifies the second-order O-question—call it [2—that explicitly
justifies m0, as in the following:
· · · (1 · · · [2 w
m0
(3 [w1 ] · · · [wn︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
m1] m) .
We consider all possible moves where l may have been introduced.
(2a) Suppose l is introduced at m0. Suppose, for a contradiction, l is defined at some
move in the segment u m1. Then the first such in the segment at which l is defined must be
an O-move; further it must be explicitly justified by m0 which forces it to be an O-answer,
which contradicts the assumption that m is explicitly justified by m0.
(2b) Suppose l is introduced by some move in the segment w above. By
Observation 1(ii), no move from w can appear in the P-view at any move in the segment
u m1, and so, l is not defined in that segment.
(2c) Suppose l is defined at [2, then l must also be defined at (1. Thus, by condition
(SC-O) and Lemma 6(ii), l is defined at each [ and ] within the segment u m1 and, in
particular, at m1. 
Remark 8. Lemma 6 fails for fourth-order games. Consider the following justified
sequence
[0 (1 [2 (3 [′2 (′3 [4 ]4 )′3 ]′2 )3
l l ′ l l l ′ l ′ l. (1)
In (1), the numeric subscript gives the (type-theoretic) order of the move, and the
O-question [4 is explicitly justified by (3. The other pointers are completely determined
by Well-Bracketing and Visibility. Assume that (1 has a null state. Suppose (3 introduces
the location l, and (′3 introduces the location l ′. Then by condition (SC-O), l is defined at[4, and so, by condition (SC-P), l is also defined at ]4. But l ′, not l, is defined at )′3 and ]′2.
Now l is defined at )3; it is not defined at m1 = ]′2 but defined at some move in the segment
u = [′2 · · · )′3, which contradicts the lemma. The point is that, as the move )3 re-enters the
thread of l, condition (SC-O) says that l should be set to the value that was held at l at
move (3, failing to take into account possible updates to l at ]4. For a concrete example, the
reader may wish to check that the legal position (1) is an interaction sequence that is played
out when (the knowing strategy denoting) λH.H (λ f.new z := 0 in f (z := 1 ;0)) of type
(((exp ⇒ exp) ⇒ exp) ⇒ exp) ⇒ exp is applied to (that denoting) λg.g(λx .g(λy.x))
of type ((exp ⇒ exp)⇒ exp)⇒ exp. 
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The State Change conditions, and the consequent Lemma 6, define an innocent
(i.e. view-dependent) notion of state, in the sense that at any point in a play, only the states
of those moves that appear in the current P-view are relevant. By adopting a “history-
sensitive” notion of state, it is possible to avoid the problem identified in Remark 8. Unfor-
tunately the price one would then have to pay is “state explosion”—even restricted to fini-
tary IA terms, the states that must be carried along in an interaction would not be bounded,
and the strategies denoting such terms would not be compactly innocent.
A play is said to be complete just in the case where every question in it is answered. A
strategy-with-state σ of an arena A is a set of prefix-closed legal positions of moves-with-
state of A satisfying:
(i) If even-length s ∈ σ and smS is a legal position then smS ∈ σ .
(ii) Determinacy: For any odd-length s ∈ σ if s mS11 and s mS22 are both in σ then m1 = m2
and S1 = S2.
We say that σ is of order n just in the case where A is of order n. In the following, we
shall often consider stateless strategies-with-state (i.e. the state of each move in every
legal position is null) which are exactly the strategies in the sense of [13] (they are called
knowing strategies in [4]). For any strategy-with-state σ , we write cplaysσ for the set of
complete plays in σ .
For any justified (or interaction) sequence u of moves-with-state, we define erase u to
be the sequence that is obtained from u by erasing the state from each move; for any
strategy-with-state σ , we define erase σ = {erase s : s ∈ σ }. We state a useful fact:
Lemma 9. Let σ be a strategy-with-state.
(i) For any s, s′ ∈ σ , if erase s = erase s′ then s = s′.
(ii) eraseσ is a knowing strategy.
Proof. We prove (i) by induction on the length of s. The base case is trivial. For the
inductive case, suppose smS, smS ′ ∈ σ . If s is odd-length then S = S′ by Determinacy. If
s is even-length then, by condition (SC-O), S and S′ are completely determined by s. Part
(ii) is a straightforward consequence of part (i). 
3.3. Composition of strategies-with-state
Suppose σ and τ are strategies-with-state of arenas A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C respectively.
Their composite σ ; τ , which will be shown to be a strategy-with-state of A ⇒ C ,
is defined in the style of “parallel composition with hiding in CSP” (as is standard in
Game Semantics) as far as the underlying moves (with pointers) are concerned. Roughly
speaking, the states of the composite strategy are obtained as the disjoint unions of the
respective states of the component strategies.
Let S and R be states. We define a new state S〈R〉, read “S strongly updated by R”, as
follows: for any l ∈ dom(S〈R〉) def= dom(S) ∪ dom(R), we have
S〈R〉(l) def=
{
R(l) if l ∈ dom(R)
S(l) otherwise.
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Note that the only difference between S〈R〉 and S[R] is the domain of definition: we have
dom(S〈R〉) = dom(S) ∪ dom(R), whereas dom(S[R]) = dom(S); the angled brackets
−〈−〉 are intended to suggest an “expansion” of the domain of definition.
Let s and s′ be justified sequences of an arena such that erase s = erase s′. We define a
relation s  s′ (read “s′ is a state extension of s”) by recursion as follows: we have   ;
and s mS  s′ mS ′ holds provided:
(i) s  s′.
(ii) S ⊆ S′.
(iii) If m is a P-move then S′ = S−〈S〉 where S− is the state of the last move of s′.
We shall assume that s  t has the force that erase s = erase t . Later in this section,
the relation  will be used in the definition of the composition of strategies-with-state;
whenever we write s  t , s will be a legal position, but t will not necessarily be a legal
position (because State Change may not necessarily be satisfied).
Let u be a sequence of moves-with-states from A, B , and C together with justification
pointers from all moves except those initial in C . Define u  (B,C) to be the subsequence
of u consisting of all moves-with-state (with pointers) from B ⇒ C; similarly define
u  (A, B, b) to be the subsequence of u consisting of all moves-with-state (with pointers)
from A ⇒ B that are hereditarily justified by the occurrence b of an initial B-move in
u. We say that u is an interaction sequence of (A, B,C) if u  (B,C) is a justified
sequence of moves-with-state of B ⇒ C satisfying Visibility and Well-Bracketing (but
not necessarily State Change), and for each occurrence b of an initial B-move in u,
u  (A, B, b) is a justified sequence of moves-with-state of A ⇒ B satisfying Visibility
and Well-Bracketing (but not necessarily State Change). We shall call u  (B,C) the
(B,C)-component of u, and call u  (A, B, b) the (A, B, b)-component of u. Note that
any move that occurs in the interaction sequence u is either a P-move of A ⇒ C , or it is
a generalized O-move in the sense that it is an O-move in exactly one of the components
of u.
Definition 10. Take σ and τ as before. We define ISeq(σ, τ ) to be the set of interaction
sequences u of (A, B,C) satisfying conditions (I1), (I2), and (I3) as follows:
I1. There exists some t ∈ τ such that t  u  (B,C).
I2. For each occurrence of an initial B-move b in u, there exists some s ∈ σ such that
s  u  (A, B, b).
I3. Suppose mS11 and m
S2
2 occur consecutively in u, and m1 is a P-move in A ⇒ C . Let
m
S0
0 be the move that explicitly justifies m2 in u. Then S2 = S0[S1].
We assume that the following sets are pairwise disjoint:
• L(A,B,b)—the set of locations introduced by P-moves of the component (A, B, b),
where b ranges over occurrences of initial B-moves in u.
• L(B,C)—the set of locations introduced by P-moves of the component (B,C).
Note that it follows from (I1) and (I2) that
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I3′. If mS11 and m
S2
2 occur consecutively in u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ), and if m1 is an O-move in
component X , then dom(S1) ⊆ dom(S2), and S2  LX = S1  LX , where (-) means
set-complementation.
For any u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) we define u  (A,C) to be the justified sequence of moves-with-
state of A ⇒ C that is obtained from u by first deleting all B-moves and then resetting
pointers from initial A-moves to the opening C-move. We can now define the composite
strategy
σ ; τ def= {u  (A,C) : u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ )}.
An important point to note is that conditions (I1), (I2), and (I3) above ensure that
the states of an interaction sequence from ISeq(σ, τ ) are completely determined by the
projected components, namely, u  (B,C) and u  (A, B, b) for each occurrence b of an
initial B-move in u, which are required to be state extensions of legal positions in σ and τ
respectively.
Lemma 11. Let σ and τ be strategies-with-state over arenas of order at most three as
before. For any u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ), there is a unique t ∈ τ such that t  u  (B,C); similarly
for each b, there is a unique s ∈ σ such that s  u  (A, B, b).
Proof. We shall just prove the lemma for component (B,C), as the argument for the other
components of the kind (A, B, b) is the same. We aim to prove: for any t1, t2 ∈ τ , if
t1, t2  u  (B,C) then t1 = t2, by induction on the length of t1. The base case is trivial
since the opening move of an interaction sequence must have a null state. For the inductive
case, suppose tmSnS1, tmSnS2  u  (B,C). If m is an O-move, then S1 = S2 because τ
satisfies Determinacy. Suppose m is a P-move from C (say), and the move in u that projects
to the last move of u  (B,C) is nT . Now nS1 and nS2 must be explicitly justified by the
same move in tmS . Hence, by condition (SC-O), we have dom(S1) = dom(S2). Since
S1, S2 ⊆ T by definition of , we have S1 = S2. We omit the case where m is a P-move
from B as it is similar. 
Remark 12. It may be helpful to unpack the definition of composition. Let b1, . . . , bk be
all the occurrences of initial B-moves in u mS ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ). By definition, the state S is
the union of the following “substates” (some or all may be null):
S  L(B,C), S  L(A,B,b1), . . . , S  L(A,B,bk).
We shall refer to S  LX as the X-component of S. Suppose u mS ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) and m
is an O-move in component (A, B, b). By Lemma 11 there is a unique s ∈ σ such that
s  u mS  (A, B, b). It follows from the definition that
u mS nT ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) if and only if for some R, we have s nR ∈ σ and T = S〈R〉;
equivalently T is obtained from S by replacing the (A, B, b)-component of S by R.
Note that restricted to every other component, S and T are the same. The case where m is
an O-move in component (B,C) is entirely similar.
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Suppose the last move of u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) is an O-move in component (B,C); thanks
to Lemma 11, we can define u  (B,C) to be t for the unique t ∈ τ such that
t  u  (B,C); similarly for u  (A, B, b).
We can now prove that composition is well-defined.
Lemma 13. The set σ ; τ as defined is a strategy-with-state over A ⇒ C.
Proof. In view of Lemma 11, we can use arguments (such as those in [13,19]) that are by
now standard to show that σ ; τ is a prefix-closed set of justified sequences over A ⇒ C
that satisfy Visibility and Well-Bracketing. It remains to show that State Change is satisfied.
Condition (SC-O) follows from (I3). For (SC-P), take an even-length s mS nT ∈ σ ; τ such
that s mS nT = u  (A,C) for some u (we take the shortest such) in ISeq(σ, τ ). Now
u must be of the form w mS aS11 · · · aSnn nT where each ai is a B-move. By successive
applications of (I3′), we have dom(S) ⊆ dom(S1) ⊆ · · · ⊆ dom(Sn) ⊆ dom(T ) as
required. 
Preservation of (third-order) composition by state-erasure
An important result of this section is the preservation of composition by state-erasure
for strategies of up to third order.
Theorem 14. For any strategies-with-state σ : A ⇒ B and τ : B ⇒ C of order at most
three, we have erase (σ ; τ ) = erase σ ; erase τ . 
As the proof is rather technical, we relegate it to Appendix A.
The Theorem does not hold if the strategies-with-state in the Theorem are of orders
greater than three—see Remark 42 for a discussion, even though composition of strategies-
with-state is well-defined at all finite orders. Suitably quotiented, strategies-with-state do
form a category, but we do not need this property because we will be using such strategies
(and, later, the innocent such), not to build a semantics, but rather to give a programmable
representation of a semantics.
3.4. Innocent strategies-with-state
The view of a legal position of moves-with-state is defined in exactly the same way as
the standard (i.e. stateless) case. However note that the view of a legal position is not in
general a legal position, because condition (SC-O) may fail. The notion of innocence in the
sense of [13] can be extended to strategies-with-state, but we need to be careful with the
freshness requirement in (SC-P). Suppose odd-length s and s′ in an innocent strategy have
the same P-view and suppose smT ∈ σ such that l is introduced at m by T . Innocence says
that s′mT ′ ∈ σ and T = T ′, but (SC-P) requires a fresh copy of l to be introduced at T ′.
Thus we need to say that a strategy-with-state σ is innocent if whenever the even-length
saSbT ∈ σ , if taS ′ ∈ σ and taS ′ = saS then taS ′bT ′ ∈ σ such that T = T ′, where
the two equalities regard different copies of the same location as equal.
Relaxation of the freshness constraint
Fortunately for innocent strategies-with-state over arenas of up to order three, the
insistence on freshness can safely be relaxed. This has several desirable consequences for
compactly innocent strategies. Not only are we justified to use the standard (and neater)
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definition of innocence (see the formulation after the proof of Lemma 15), but more
importantly, it makes a proof of compositionality possible. Crucially, in Section 5, we
shall see that this enables a DPDA characterization of third-order strategies. Safety in this
context amounts to the following properties: even though O may be able to force P to open
as many threads of a location as he wishes,
(1) no two threads of location l can ever overlap in time,
(2) when a previous thread is re-entered, the contents of the location is set to the value last
held in that thread.
To establish the properties, we first fix some notation. Take a play u in an innocent strategy
σ , and suppose t1aS  t2 and t2 aS  u (assume that these are all the occurrences of a
in u) such that t1 = t2 = p. Suppose l is a location introduced by the P-move aS .
According to the freshness assumption in condition (SC-P), the location l introduced by the
second occurrence of a (after t2) in u should be a fresh copy, distinct from the l introduced
by the first occurrence of a, because they define independent lifetimes of the same local
variable.
• For (1), suppose l is defined at some move bT in u. Then, by Lemma 6, p aS is a prefix
of the P-view at that point, where a is one of the two occurrences of a. Plainly only one
such instance of a can appear in the P-view.
• For (2) we shall show that it is enough to modify the definition of S0[S1] slightly:
suppose mS is an O-move which is explicitly justified by mS00 , and suppose the move
preceding mS is mS11 which is explicitly justified by mS1010 ; we define dom(S0[S1]) def=
dom(S0) and for l ∈ dom(S0[S1])
S0[S1](l) def=
{
S1(l) if l ∈ dom(S1) ∩ dom(S10),
S0(l) otherwise.
Lemma 15. Take the setting of t1aS  t2 and t2aS  u ∈ σ , and l is introduced at aS as
before, and write p = t1 = t2. Let s m0 u m1 m be a prefix of u in which the O-move
m is explicitly justified by m0. Suppose the location l is defined at m0 (so by condition (SC-
O), l is also defined at m) and also at m1. Equivalently p aS is a prefix of both s m0 and
s m0 u m1. Then the same occurrence of a in u appears in the two P-views (equivalently,
the l at m0 and the l at m1 belong to the same thread) iff l is defined at m10.
Proof. We consider the two possibilities in turn:
(A) either the same occurrence of aS in u appears in the two P-views, or
(B) they are from different occurrences.
With reference to the case analysis in the proof of Lemma 7, the cases that are consistent
with (A) are (1a), (1b), and (2c). In all three, p aS , where a is that same occurrence of a,
is a prefix of the P-view at m10, the move that explicitly justifies m1; whence l is defined
at m10. The only cases consistent with (B) are (2a) and (2b). The occurrence of aS in the
P-view at m1 is different from the occurrence in the P-view at m0; i.e. they are (projected)
from different occurrences of aS in u. We note that in these cases p aS is not a prefix of
the P-view at m10; whence l is not defined at m10. 
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Warning. Henceforth we shall use the new definition of state update S0[S1] without
further comment.
Thanks to the lemma, we may say that a strategy-with-state σ (of order at most three)
is innocent if whenever the even-length saSbT ∈ σ , if taS ∈ σ and taS = saS then
taSbT ∈ σ . As in the stateless case, innocent strategies are completely determined by view
functions, which are maps from odd-length P-views p to justified P-moves (i.e. a P-move
together with a pointer into p). We say that σ is generated by a view function f , written
σ = strat( f ), just in the case where for any s ∈ σ , if saS is a legal position, then we have
saSbT ∈ σ if and only if saS ∈ dom( f ) and f (saS) = bT . (Note that the definition
does not require every P-view in the domain of f to be the P-view of some legal position
in σ .)
Theorem 16. Suppose σ : A ⇒ B and τ : B ⇒ C are innocent strategies-with-state of
order at most three; then the composite σ ; τ is an innocent strategy-with-state. 
For the proof, we use essentially the same argument as the compositionality proof
in [13]. The key idea is what McCusker has aptly referred to as the core, written u, of
an interaction sequence u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) (see also [13, Proposition 5.4]). We set out the
proof in Appendix B.
Example 17. We give some examples of innocent strategies-with-state.
(i) The usual innocent strategies (without state) are of course innocent strategies-with-
states. Thus the canonical maps such as identities and projections are examples. If
σ : C ⇒ A and τ : C ⇒ B are innocent strategies-with-state, so is the pairing
〈σ, τ 〉 : C ⇒ (A× B). Note also that modulo renaming of moves, innocent strategies-
with-state of C ⇒ (A ⇒ B) are the same as those of C × A ⇒ B .
(ii) The strategy generated by the “good-location” view function locl,i (see Section 4.2) is
an important example.
3.5. Effective compositionality of compactly innocent strategies-with-state
The view function f that generates an innocent strategy-with-states can be presented as
the least prefix-closed set tree( f ) of P-views such that even-length P-views p mS ∈ tree( f )
iff f (p) = mS . We shall refer to tree( f ) as the evaluation tree of f (or of strat( f )). Note
that in general tree( f )  strat( f ) and strat( f )  tree( f ).
We say that an innocent strategy-with-state is compact if it is generated by a view
function whose domain of definition is finite. The last result of this section is the effective
compositionality of compact innocent strategies-with-state. We give an algorithm that takes
view functions f and g such that strat( f ) : A ⇒ B and strat(g) : B ⇒ C are innocent,
and returns the evaluation tree of the composite strat( f ) ; strat(g). This algorithm is not
new: it can be extracted from the proof of compositionality of innocent strategies in [13].
The version here, called Algorithm A in Fig. 3, is presented specifically for the stateful
case, which of course applies only to innocent strategies-with-states of order at most
three. However it is important to stress that the stateless version of the Algorithm (which
is obtained from Algorithm A by removing all state information) applies to innocent
strategies of all orders in the stateless case.
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Fig. 3. Algorithm A.
Theorem 18 (Effective Compositionality). Algorithm A takes as input finite view
functions f and g such that strat( f ) : A ⇒ B and strat(g) : B ⇒ C are innocent
strategies of finite arenas, and returns the evaluation tree tree(h) of a view function h such
that strat(h) = strat( f ) ; strat(g) : A ⇒ C. 
Algorithm A works by generating interaction sequences u between strat( f ) and strat(g)
which are short-sighted in the sense that any move in u which is an O-move of A ⇒ C
is explicitly justified by the preceding move in u (which must be a P-move in A ⇒ C ,
by the Switching Condition2 for function space arenas). To the best of our knowledge,
no proof of the effective compositionality of compact innocent strategies has ever appeared
in the literature. Here we shall just prove termination of the algorithm, which amounts to
showing that there are no infinite short-sighted interaction sequences.
The stateless case
We formulate the result, namely Theorem 21, in a general form that applies to stateless
innocent strategies of all orders. By virtue of the strong correspondence between compactly
2 For any legal position u m m′ of a function space arena A ⇒ B , if m is a P-move, then either m and m′ are
both from A or both from B .
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innocent strategies and finite canonical forms in the sense of [13], the theorem is essentially
equivalent to the normalizability of (a variant of) PCF. Here we shall give a more direct,
first-principles proof. First, we state two lemmas:
Lemma 19. Suppose t is a play of arena A ⇒ B such that every O-move from A in t is
explicitly justified by the preceding move; then t  BB = tA⇒B  B. 
We omit the straightforward induction argument.
Lemma 20 (Hyland). For any infinite play w over a finite arena, either the set of P-views
spanned by w (i.e. {s : s  w} where s  ω means “s is a prefix of ω”) is infinite, or
the set of O-views spanned by w is infinite. 
The above lemma first appeared (in a slightly different form) in [12]. It can be proved
by induction on the size of the arena.
We can now establish termination of the algorithm:
Theorem 21 (The Stateless Case). Suppose A, B, and C are arenas that have finite
depths (i.e. the orders of questions have a finite upper bound), and f and g are finite
view functions over arenas A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C respectively. There is no infinite justified
sequence such that every finite prefix is short-sighted and in ISeq(strat( f ), strat(g)).
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, there is such an infinite sequence π . Then π  (B,C)
must contain infinitely many occurrences of B-moves; for otherwise, beyond a certain
point, either π consists of only C-moves, or it consists of only A-moves from π 
(A, B, b), for some occurrence b of an initial B-move. Suppose the latter. As π is assumed
to be short-sighted, after some finite prefix, π  (A, B, b) must also be short-sighted
(because π consists of only A-moves). Thus the set of P-views spanned by π  (A, B, b)
is infinite, which contradicts the finiteness of f . A similar argument applies in the former
case.
By assumption, every finite prefix of π  (B,C) (which we shall write simply as π0) is
in strat(g). Since g is finite, the set of P-views spanned by π0 is finite. We claim that the set
of O-views spanned by π0 is also finite. As π0 is infinite, this would contradict Lemma 20.
We first consider O-views of finite prefixes of π0 that end in a C-move. Because of
short-sightedness, every O-move in π0 that is from C is explicitly justified by the preceding
(P-)move, which is also from C , by the Switching Condition for function space arenas.
Thus by a straightforward induction argument, (π0)c, where c is a C-move in π0, is
precisely the justification history of c. Since B ⇒ C has finite depth, there are only finitely
many O-views of such a shape.
Next we consider O-views of finite prefixes of π0 that end in a B-move b. We write b0
for the (occurrence of the) initial B-move in π0 that hereditarily justifies b. By the O-view
Projection lemma in [13], we have
(π0)bB⇒C = c0 · (π0)b  (B, b0)B
where c0 is the opening move of π0. Set tb = πb  (A, B, b0). We then have
(π0)b  (B, b0) = tb  B . As tb satisfies the premises of Lemma 19, we have
tb  BB = tbA⇒B  B . Since tb ∈ strat( f ) and f is finite, there are only finitely
many P-views of the form tbA⇒B , and hence there are only finitely many P-views of the
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form tbA⇒B  B . Thus the set of P-views of the form (π0)b  (B, b0)B , and hence
the set of O-views of the form (π0)bB⇒C , as b ranges over occurrences of B-moves in
π0, is finite. 
The third-order stateful case
We specialize Theorem 21 to the stateful case:
Lemma 22 (The Third-order Stateful Case). Suppose f and g are finite view functions
over finite arenas A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C respectively. Assume that the arenas are at most
third-order. There is no infinite justified sequence such that every finite prefix is short-
sighted and in ISeq(strat( f ), strat(g)).
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, there is such an infinite sequence. Erase all state
information from the infinite sequence, and call the resultant sequence π . We then use the
proof of Theorem 21, noting that all occurrences of strat( f ) and strat(g) in the argument
should be replaced by erase (strat( f )) and erase (strat(g)) respectively. Note that even
though the erased strategy erase (strat( f )) is not in general innocent, the set of P-views
spanned by legal positions in erase (strat( f )) is finite; similarly for erase (strat(g)). Indeed
erase (strat( f )) is generated, not by a finite view function, but by a finite view relation. 
Lemma 22 can also be proved by a syntactic argument (using Theorem 27). It is
essentially equivalent to the normalizability of third-order finitary IA terms to finite
canonical forms defined in Section 4.3.
4. Innocent representation of third-order Idealized Algol
We begin this section with a summary of the knowing-strategy semantics of IA.
We then give the innocent strategy-with-state denotation of third-order IA, and prove
that the strategies denoting the finitary fragment are compactly innocent and effectively
computable. The innocent denotation is not a model of the (theory of IA restricted to
the) third-order fragment; rather it should be regarded as an algorithmic representation
of the knowing-strategy semantics. The relationship between the two denotations is given
in Theorem 25. We conclude the section with a definability result.
4.1. Knowing-strategy semantics of IA
For notational simplicity, we shall write exp for the arena that denotes the type exp,
and similarly for loc and com. The arena exp is just the standard natural numbers arena
with move-set {q} ∪N where q is the initial question that justifies each answer n ∈ N. The
arena com is a two-move arena whose initial question run justifies the answer-move done.
Following Reynolds, the type loc of locations is interpreted in an object-oriented style as
a product of its “read method” and its “write method”. Thus the arena loc is the product
arena exp × comω, whereby the first component is the value that is held at the location,
and the second component contains countably many commands to write 0, 1, 2, etc., to the
location; we write the question-move and the answer-move in the i -th copy of com in loc
as write(i) and oki (or simply ok) respectively.
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The purely functional constructs of IA are standardly interpreted by the canonical maps
of the cartesian closed category of arenas and knowing strategies. Here we shall just give
the semantic definitions of the imperative constructs. Command sequencing is interpreted
by the strategy seqcomp over the arena com ⇒ (com ⇒ com) specified by the following
(unique) maximal play:
com ⇒ com ⇒ com
run
run
done
run
done
done
To interpret dereferencing and assignment to variable, we exploit the fact that comω is
a retract of exp ⇒ com. That is to say, writing the maps as
comω (exp ⇒ com) comω
we have sec ; ret = idcomω . For assignment, we use the map
loc comω (exp ⇒ com)
while dereferencing is just the first projection π1 : loc exp. The bad-location construct
mkloc is interpreted as
exp× (exp ⇒ com) (exp× comω) = loc.
The reader may wish to check that all the imperative constructs considered thus far are
in fact interpreted by innocent strategies. It now remains to consider the interpretation of
the new-block, for which we need to introduce a non-innocent strategy. For each i ≥ 0,
we define a knowing strategy newi over the arena (loc ⇒ exp) ⇒ exp by specifying its
maximal plays to be words that are generated by the linear3 context-free grammar:
S → q1 · q2 · Si
k ≥ 0, Sk → read · k · Sk +
(∑
j≥0 write( j) · ok · Sj
)
+ (∑m≥0 m2 · m1) (2)
or equivalently words that match the regular expression:
q1 · q2 · (read · i)∗ ·

∑
n≥0
write(n) · ok · (read · n)∗

∗ ·∑
m≥0
m2 · m1. (3)
The alphabet in question is the move-set of (loc ⇒ exp) ⇒ exp. To distinguish the two
copies of exp, we mark moves from the rightmost copy of exp with subscript 1, and those
3 A context-free grammar is linear if every rule is either of the form P → w Q or of the form P → w, where
P and Q are non-terminal symbols and w is a word of the alphabet. A language over a finite alphabet is regular
if and only if it is generated by a linear grammar.
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from the other copy with subscript 2. For arenas of up to second order, we may safely repre-
sent legal positions as sequences of moves, as the justification pointers are uniquely recon-
structible. Note that as defined, the language generated by the grammar is not regular be-
cause exp (and hence the alphabet) is infinite. In the following, we shall consider versions
of newi over finite arenas (loc ⇒ expN )⇒ expN , where expN is a finite subarena of exp.
The strategy newi has precisely the behaviour expected of a “good location” which has
been initialized to i : the answer in response to a read is always the last value written, or
i if no write-move has yet been played. There is a similar version of the “good location
strategy” over the arena (loc ⇒ com) ⇒ com, which we shall also write as newi . We
leave its definition as an exercise for the reader. We can now define
[[Γ  new x := n in M : β]]κ def= [[Γ  λx : loc.M : loc ⇒ β]]κ ;newn
where β = exp, com.
Using knowing-strategy semantics, the observational preorder of IA may be
characterized in terms of complete plays as follows:
Theorem 23 (Characterization). For any Γ , A, M1, and M2 such that Γ  Mi : A is
provable for i = 1, 2, we have
M1 M2 cplays [[Γ  M1 : A]]κ ⊆ cplays [[Γ  M2 : A]]κ.
For a proof, we recommend the comparatively simple argument in [20]; see also [4]. The
Characterization Theorem plays an important role in the main decidability result of the
paper.
4.2. Innocent strategy-with-state representation
Henceforth, without further mention, all arenas, plays, strategies, and IA terms-in-
context are assumed to have order at most three.
Consider the knowing-strategy interpretation [[Γ , x : loc  M: exp]]κ . Over the arena
in question, only P can switch in and out of the loc component. After P has played
a write(i) move, O can only play ok, but after a read move, O is free to play any
answer move n ∈ N. Thus the values that are read from a (free) assignable variable are
unrelated to the values that have been written to it. The new binder, which is interpreted
by precomposition with new j , forces the memory cell to behave as a “good location”;
i.e. [[Γ  new x := j in M : exp]]κ consists of plays that are obtained by first taking those
of [[Γ , x : loc  M : exp]]κ in which each read is followed by the last written value, and
then hiding (i.e. deleting) all moves from the loc component, thus making the state implicit.
The idea behind the strategy-with-state denotation is simply to recover the hidden state
information S at each move and represent it explicitly with the move m, forming a pair mS ,
which we call moves-with-state. One way to think of the explicit semantics is to consider
the uncovering [13] of plays in [[Γ  new x := j in M : exp]]κ with respect to the hidden
loc component: if mS is the first visible move after a hidden write(i) move, then S(l) = i
recording the state change. Note that such an mS is necessarily a P-move (because of the
Switching Condition), so only P can change the state. A key development of this approach
is that up to third order, such strategies-with-state are innocent, i.e. view dependent.
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The strategy-with-state denotation of a third-order IA term-in-context, which we shall
write as [[Γ  M : A]], is defined for the most part by the same inductive clauses
as define the knowing-strategy semantics. Strictly speaking, the innocent strategy-with-
state denotation is not a semantics of IA (because it does not model the theory), but a
representation of the knowing-strategy semantics. The precise relationship between the
representation and the semantics is given in Theorem 25.
We first observe that the semantic constructions defining the purely functional part of
IA are operations that preserve innocent strategies-with-state:
(i) The canonical maps evalA,B : (A ⇒ B) × A ⇒ B and πi : A1 × A2 Ai are
innocent strategies-with-state (because they are innocent strategies in the standard,
state-less, sense).
(ii) Given innocent strategies-with-state σ : C ⇒ A and τ : C ⇒ B , the standard pairing
construction defines an innocent strategy-with-state 〈σ, τ 〉 : C ⇒ (A× B). Note also
that erase 〈σ, τ 〉 = 〈erase σ, erase τ 〉.
(iii) Modulo renaming of moves, innocent strategies-with-state of the arena (C × A)⇒ B
are exactly those of the arena C ⇒ (A ⇒ B).
Thus we can use the standard inductive clauses to define the innocent strategy-with-
state denotation of the purely functional constructs. For the interpretation of command
sequencing, assignment, dereferencing, and the bad-location constructor, we can also use
the same inductive clauses as define their respective knowing-strategy semantics:
[[Γ  M ; N : β]] = 〈[[Γ  M : com]], [[Γ  N : β]]〉 ;seqcomp
[[Γ  M := N : com]] = 〈[[Γ  M : loc]], [[Γ  N : exp]]〉 ;uncurry(π2 ;sec)
[[Γ  !M : exp]] = [[Γ  M : loc]] ;π2
and
[[Γ  mkloc M N : loc]]
= 〈[[Γ  mkloc N : exp]], [[Γ  mkloc M : exp ⇒ com]]〉 ; id × ret.
Note that seqcomp, uncurry(π2 ;sec), π2, and id × ret are all innocent, and innocent
strategies-with-state compose.
Finally, for the new-block, given any i ≥ 0 and any location l, we define the view
function locl,i over the arena (loc ⇒ exp)⇒ exp:
locl,i :


q1 → q(l,i)2
q1 · q(l,i)2 · read(l,k) → k(l,k)
q1 · q(l,i)2 · write( j)(l,k) → ok(l, j )
q1 · q(l,i)2 · m(l,k)2 → m(l,k)1
(4)
for each j, k,m ≥ 0. As in (2), we use subscripts to distinguish moves from the two
copies of exp; we write m(l,i) as a shorthand for the move whose state maps location l
to i . The idea behind the view function is simple: the state of a move in strat(locl,i ) is
given by the value held at the location l at that point. Thus the answer in response to a
read-move read(l,k) is the value stored at l, namely k(l,k) (with the state left unchanged);
the state can only be changed by a write-move: P’s response to the O-move write( j)(l,k)
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is to change the state to (l, j). The reader may wish to check that the maximal plays of
strat(locl,i ), as sequences of moves, form a language generated by the following linear
grammar:
S → q1 · q(l,i)2 · Si
k ≥ 0, Sk → read(l,k) · k(l,k) · Sk
+ ∑ j≥0 write( j)(l,k) · ok(l, j ) · Sj
+ ∑m≥0 m(l,k)2 · m(l,k)1 .
(5)
This is just another description of the behaviour of a “good location” initialized to i , which
is equivalent to that specified by the knowing strategy newi in the following sense:
Lemma 24. For each i ≥ 0, we have erase (strat(locl,i )) = newi .
Proof. As the maximal plays of strat(locl,i ) are generated by the grammar (5), the
maximal plays of erase (strat(locl,i )) are generated by the rules obtained from (5) by
state-erasure. The erased rules are exactly those that generate the maximal plays of newi
in (2). 
We leave the definition of the corresponding “good location” view function over the
arena (loc ⇒ com) ⇒ com, which we shall also write as locl,i , as an exercise. For
β = exp and com, we are now in a position to define
[[Γ  new x := n in M : β]] def= [[Γ  λx : loc.M : loc ⇒ β]] ; strat(locl,n)
where l is a fresh location. Thanks to Lemma 24 and Theorem 14, we can clarify
the relationship between the innocent-strategy denotation of a term and its knowing-
strategy semantics: the former should be regarded as an algorithmic representation of the
latter.
Theorem 25. For any valid finitary third-order IA term-in-context Γ  M : A:
(i) We have erase [[Γ  M : A]] = [[Γ  M : A]]κ .
(ii) If the types are built up from finite base types, then [[Γ  M : A]] is a compactly
innocent strategy-with-state strat( fM ), and the interpretation M → fM is effectively
computable.
Proof. We prove (i) and (ii) simultaneously by structural induction over M . We shall only
consider two constructs for illustration. In the case of application, we have
erase [[Γ  M N : B]]
= erase 〈[[Γ  M : A ⇒ B]], [[Γ  N : A]]〉 ; erase eval by Theorem 14
= 〈erase [[Γ  M : A ⇒ B]], erase [[Γ  N : A]]〉 ;eval
= 〈[[Γ  M : A ⇒ B]]κ, [[Γ  N : A]]κ〉 ;eval by I.H.
= [[Γ  M N : B]]κ.
For (ii) we note that 〈[[Γ  M : A ⇒ B]]κ, [[Γ  N : A]]κ〉 is a compactly innocent
strategy-with-state, because by the induction hypothesis both the component strategies
are compact, and pairing preserves compactness. Since eval is compactly innocent,
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Fig. 4. The view function of Θ1 in Example 26.
and composition preserves compactly innocent strategies-with-state (Theorem 18), [[Γ 
M N : B]]κ is a compactly innocent strategy-with-state. For effectivity, we need only
observe that pairing and composition are effective operations. The same reasoning applies
for the case of command sequencing, assignment, dereferencing and the bad-location
constructor.
Next we consider the case of the new-block:
erase [[Γ  new x := n in M : β]]
= erase [[Γ  λx : loc.M : loc ⇒ β]] ;erase (strat(locl,n)) by Theorem 14
= [[Γ  λx : loc.M : loc ⇒ β]]κ ;newn
= [[Γ  new x := n in M : β]]κ .
The last step is by the induction hypothesis and by Lemma 24. Part (ii) follows from
Theorem 18 and the fact that locl,i is a finite view function. 
Example 26. For ease of explanation we shall consider a third-order type that is built up
from a finite base type exp[B] where B = {0, 1}. Take the following terms:
Θ1 = λF.new x := 0 in F(λy.(ifzero !x then x := y else x := ¬y) ; !x)
Θ2 = λF.F(λy.new x := 0 in (ifzero !x then x := y else x := ¬y) ; !x)
Θ3 = λF.F(λy.y)
of type ((exp[B] ⇒ exp[B]) ⇒ exp[B]) ⇒ exp[B]. View functions that generate [[Θ1]]
and [[Θ2]] are presented as evaluation trees in Figs. 4 and 5 respectively. In the figures, q0,
q1, q2, and q3 are the four questions of the arena (the subscript is the type-theoretic order
of the question); “m, i” is a shorthand for the move m whose state maps a fixed location l
(say) to i , whereas “m” means that the state is null. Note that the view function specified
by the tree is just the map p → m{(l,i)}, where p · “m, i” ranges over even-length path of
the tree; the pointer of m into p is uniquely determined in each case.
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Fig. 5. The view function of Θ2 in Example 26.
Paths in an evaluation tree (which are P-views) are not necessarily legal positions
because the condition (SC-O) is not required to hold. However the reader may wish to
verify that every P-view in the evaluation tree (determined by) Θ2 is the P-view of some
legal position in the associated innocent strategy; the same is true of Θ1. (Note that this is
not true in general: just consider, for example, the evaluation tree determined by λx .new z :
= 0 in x .) A behavioural difference between the two strategiesΘ1 andΘ2 is worth noting:
the else branch of Θ2 is never executed. In fact Θ2 determines the same evaluation tree as
Θ4 = λF.F(λy.new x := 0 in x := y ; !x).
That is, [[Θ2]] = [[Θ4]].
As an illustration of operational reasoning based on game semantics, we shall prove that
Θ2 ≈ Θ3, but Θ1 Θ2 and Θ2 Θ1. Now it is straightforward to see that erase [[Θ4]] =
[[Θ3]]κ . It then follows from Theorem 25(i) that cplays [[Θ2]]κ = cplays [[Θ3]]κ , and hence,
by Theorem 23, we have Θ2 ≈ Θ3.
Using the view function in Fig. 4, we construct the following legal positions of moves-
with-state:
q0 (q1, 0) (q2, 0) (q3, 0) (1, 0) (1, 1) (q2, 1) (q3, 1) (0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
is in [[Θ1]]. (Note that neither q0 (q1, 0) (q2, 1) nor q0 (q1, 0) (q2, 0) (q3, 0) (1, 1) (say)
are legal positions of [[Θ1]] because condition (SC-O) is violated.) Similarly we have
q0 q1 q2 (q3, 0) (1, 0) (1, 1) q2 (q3, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) 0 0
is in [[Θ2]]. (Again the justification pointers in the legal positions above are uniquely recon-
structible.) Thus, by Theorem 25, we obtain the following (complete) plays by erasure:{
q0 q1 q2 q3 1 1 q2 q3 0 1 1 1 ∈ erase [[Θ1]] = [[Θ1]]κ
q0 q1 q2 q3 1 1 q2 q3 0 0 0 0 ∈ erase [[Θ2]] = [[Θ2]]κ. (6)
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Observe that owing to Determinacy the first legal position above does not belong to
[[Θ2]]κ , and for the same reason, the second does not belong to [[Θ1]]κ . Hence, thanks
to Theorem 23, we have Θ1 Θ2 and Θ2 Θ1.
Further, by the definability theorem in [4], given a complete play that belongs to the
knowing-strategy denotation of one term but not that of the other, we can construct a pro-
gram context that separates the two terms. For example, a context that is constructed from
the first complete play in (6) is
D[-] = [-](λg.ifzero (g1) thenΩ else (g0))
where the hole [-] is of type ((exp ⇒ exp[B]) ⇒ exp[B]) ⇒ exp[B]. The reader may
wish to check that D[Θ1] ⇓ 1 but D[Θ2] ⇓ 0.
4.3. A definability result
We augment IA by a case construct
Γ  M : exp Γ  Mi : φ for each 0 ≤ i < l
Γ  case(M)[0 → M0 | · · · | l − 1 → Ml−1] : φ
where φ is either exp or com.
Theorem 27 (Definability). For any compactly innocent strategy-with-state σ = strat( f )
over an arena A = (A1 ⇒ · · · ⇒ An ⇒ φ) where n ≥ 0, there is a finitary IA-term Mσ
such that [[ Mσ : A]] = σ .
Proof. We use (A1, . . . , An, φ) as a shorthand for A1 ⇒ A2 ⇒ · · · ⇒ An ⇒ φ. There
are three cases, corresponding to φ = com, or loc, or exp where Nd = {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}.
We shall just consider the first two cases as the third is similar to the first.
Case 1: A = (A1, . . . , An, com). If dom( f ) = ∅ then Mσ = λ f A11 · · · f Ann .Ω . If
f : run → doneS (for simplicity we shall consider a simple state S = (l, 2), where
(l, k) is our shorthand for the function {(l, k)}), then
Mσ = λ f A11 · · · f Ann .new x := 2 inskip.
Suppose f maps run, the initial move of A, to an initial question of Ai = (C1, . . . ,Cm , φ′)
where m ≥ 0 and each C j = (D j1, . . . , D jr j , φ j ) where r j ≥ 0. There are three subcases
corresponding to φ′ = exp or com or loc.
(a) Suppose Ai = (C1, . . . ,Cm , com), so that f : run → run(l,2). Let [C j be an initial
move of C j . For each 1 ≤ j ≤ m and for each 0 ≤ k < d , consider the set of P-views
p such that run run(l,2) [(l,k)C j p ∈ σ . This set, which defines a view function, determines an
innocent strategy-with-state σ j k of the arena (A1, . . . , An, D j1, . . . , D jr j , com). As the
corresponding view function has a smaller size than f , by the induction hypothesis, we
have that Mσ jk is
λ f gD j1j1 · · · g
D jr j
j r j .new x, y := a jk, b jk in Tjk .
(For simplicity we assume that only one new location, namely, l ′, is introduced.) Similarly,
for each 0 ≤ k < d , by considering the set of P-views p such that run run(l,2)done(l,k)
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p ∈ σ , we obtain an innocent strategy-with-state of the arena (A1, . . . , An, com), and so,
by the induction hypothesis, a corresponding term
λ f A11 · · · f Ann .new x, z := ck, dk inUk .
Thus Mσ is λ f .new x := 2 in fi (θ1 · · · θm) ;case(!x)[k → αk] where αk is new z :=
dk in x := ck ;Uk and θ j is
λg j .case(!x)[k → new y := b jk in x := a jk ; Tjk].
(b) Ai = (C1, . . . ,Cm ,exp). Let (Ai be the initial move of Ai . For each 0 ≤ j, k < d ,
by considering the set of P-views p such that run((l,2)Ai j (l,k) p ∈ σ where “ j” is a numeric
answer to (Ai , by the induction hypothesis, we obtain λ f .new x, w := e jk, h jk inU jk .
Thus Mσ is
λ f .new x := 2 incase( fiθ)[ j → case(!x)[k → β j k]]
where each β j k is neww := h jk in x := e jk ;case(!x)[k → U jk] and θ j is as before.
(c) Ai = (C1, . . . ,Cm , loc). There are two subcases. If f : run → write(l)(l,2) then Mσ is
λ f .new x := 2 in fiθ := l ′ ;case(!x)[k → αk] where each θ j and αk are as before. If
f : run → read(l,2) then Mσ is
λ f .new x := 2 incase(! fiθ)[ j → case(!x)[k → β j k]]
where each θ j and β j k is as before.
Case 2: A = (A1, . . . , An, loc). σ decomposes into compactly innocent strategies-with-
state σ ′ : (A1, . . . , An,exp), and for each 0 ≤ i < d , σ ′′i : (A1, . . . , An, com). By
the induction hypothesis, we have Mσ ′ = λ f .P and Mσ ′′i = λ f .Qi . Take Mσ to be
λ f .mkloc (λx .case(x)[i → Qi ]) P . 
We remark that the Mσ in the theorem can be chosen to be λx .c where c has a fixed
shape, which is called a finite canonical form. We define FCF[Γ ], the set of finite canonical
forms whose free variables are in Γ , as follows. Set Γ = f1 : A1, . . . , fn : An .
• For any value v, we have v ∈ FCF[Γ ].
• If Pj,n ∈ FCF[Γ , y j1, . . . , y jr j ], and Pm,n ∈ FCF[Γ ] then
new x := k in case( fi Θ1 · · ·Θl)[m → case(!x)[n → Pm,n]] ∈ FCF[Γ ]
where Ai = (D1, . . . , Dl , β), D j = (D j1, . . . , D jr j , β j ), and each
Θ j = λy j .case(!x)[n → Pj,n].
(Note that for simplicity, we consider the simple case here where there is just one local
variable x .)
5. DPDA characterization and decidability results
In this section we explain how legal positions over finite arenas can be encoded as
words of a finite alphabet. Using the encoding, we show that the compactly innocent
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strategy-with-state (or equivalently, view function) denoting any third-order finitary IA
term determines a deterministic pushdown automaton (DPDA) that recognizes exactly
the complete plays of the knowing-strategy semantics of the term. Since such plays
characterize observational equivalence, and there is an algorithm for deciding whether
any two DPDAs recognize the same language, we obtain a procedure for deciding the
observational equivalence for that fragment of IA.
5.1. Encoding pointers by view offset
We use a simple encoding scheme, called view offset, for representing legal positions
as words of an alphabet. For any even-length legal position s m, we encode the pointer of
the P-move m to q (say), which must appear in s by Visibility, by a numeric offset n
that is defined to be the number of pending O-questions that occur after q in the P-view
s. Similarly the pointer of an O-move can be given in terms of an offset relative to the
O-view at that point. The move m with view offset n may then be encoded by (say) the
word on m—the prefix on (= o · · · o︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) is taken to be the unary numeral n. A legal position
can thus be represented as a concatenation of such words. Note that the view-offset scheme
is quite general: it works for legal positions of all finite orders.
The encoding scheme may be simplified in several ways. First there is no need to
represent explicitly the pointer of an answer-move: by decreeing that such a pointer
is always to the last pending question, we can use a pushdown stack to verify Well-
Bracketing. Secondly, in the third-order case, a further simplification is possible, thanks
to the following lemma.
Lemma 28. Fix a third-order arena.
(i) Let s be an even-length legal position. If there is a pending first-order P-question in s,
then there is a unique pending first-order P-question (namely the second element) in
s, and that question must also appear in s.
(ii) Further if another legal position t has the same P-view as s, then s and t contain
the same unique pending first-order question.
We may assume that the s in (i) and the t in (ii) are legal positions that do not necessarily
satisfy State Change. In particular, we may take t in (ii) to be s.
Proof. We prove (i) and (ii) simultaneously. Let m be the last move of s, and so, also of
t because s = t. Since s has a pending first-order question, m cannot be an answer
to the initial move of s because of Well-Bracketing. Suppose m is a first-order P-question,
we have s = t = [0m where [0 is the initial move, and m is the unique pending
first-order P-question, and we are done. Suppose m is either a second-order P-answer or a
third-order P-question. Let [2 be the second-order O-question that explicitly justifies m in
s. By Visibility, [2 appears in s<m and so also in s = t; for the same reason, the
first-order P-question (1 which explicitly justifies [2 in s also appears in s = t. Now
s[2 and t[2 fit the shape of the legal position in Observation 1(i), and so, both s[2 and
t[2 have a unique pending first-order P-question, namely, (1. Since s = s[2m and
t = t[2m, we are done. 
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Remark 29. An essential task in the representation of legal positions (of an innocent
strategy) is the verification of O-Visibility. To do that using a state machine, it would seem
necessary, in general, to countenance infinitely many control-states, as the legal positions
of even a compactly innocent strategy can trace out infinitely many O-views. Lemma 28
tells us that, up to third order, O-views can safely be ignored in the representation, as
O-Visibility may be verified using only P-views.
By the lemma (applied to t = s), the pointer of an O-question (which is necessarily
second-order, as the zeroth-order O-question has no pointer by definition) is to the unique
first-order pending P-question that appears in the O-view, and that P-question is guaranteed
to appear in the P-view at that point. Therefore there is no need to consider O-views at all.
Indeed because the justifying P-question is unique, there is no need to represent the pointer
of any second-order question. There is also no need to represent the pointer of any first-
order question as it must be to the opening question. Thus only the pointers of third-order
P-questions (in a legal position of a third-order arena) need to be coded explicitly.
Finally in the case of a third-order compact innocent strategy strat( f ) generated by
some finite view function f , yet another simplification is possible. Instead of coding a
third-order P-question with an offset-i pointer as oi (, we can simply introduce a new
symbol as a name for the word oi (—this is quite harmless as the view offsets are bounded
above by the length of the longest P-view in the domain of f .
Complete plays of third-order knowing strategies are not regular
Using the view-offset encoding, we can regard the set of complete plays of a knowing
strategy denoting a third-order finitary IA term as a set of words. In general such sets are
not regular. Our proof uses a theorem due independently to Myhill [23] and Nerode [24]. (It
is also possible to obtain a proof using the Pumping lemma, but the argument is somewhat
more complicated.) For any L ⊆ Σ∗ whereΣ is a given finite alphabet, we say that strings
x and y are L-indistinguishable, written x ≡L y, just in the case where for every string z,
xz ∈ L iff yz ∈ L. It is easy to see that ≡L is an equivalence relation. The Myhill–Nerode
Theorem (see e.g. [15] for a careful account) says that L is regular iff ≡L has finitely many
equivalence classes; moreover the number of equivalence classes is the size of the smallest
deterministic finite automaton that accepts L.
Lemma 30. In general the set of complete plays of the knowing-strategy denotation of a
third-order finitary IA term is not regular.
Proof. Set A = ((o ⇒ o) ⇒ o) ⇒ o where o is any arena that has only one question
and one answer (such as com). Take σ to be [[λF.F(λx .x)]]κ which is an innocent strategy
over A. We write the four questions of A as [0, (1, [2 and (3, and their corresponding
answers as ]0, )1, ]2, and )3 respectively; the (type-theoretic) order of each move is
annotated as a subscript, and we take (3 to mean “the third-order P-question with view
offset 0”. In the following we consider complete plays of σ as words over the alphabet
Σ = {[0, (1, [2, (3, ]0, )1, ]2, )3}—let L be the set of such plays. For each i ≥ 0, we write
li = [0(1 [2(3 · · · [2(3︸ ︷︷ ︸
2i questions
and ri = )3]2 · · · )3]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2i answers
)1]0. Now for any i, j ≥ 0, if i = j then
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liri ∈ L but l j ri /∈ L. Hence the relation ≡L has infinitely many equivalence classes. It
follows from the Myhill–Nerode Theorem that L is not regular. 
5.2. Deterministic pushdown automata: a review
We give a quick review of the basic definitions. A deterministic pushdown automaton
(DPDA) is specified by a 6-tuple P = 〈Q, init,Σ ,Γ ,⊥, δ〉 where Q is a finite set of
(control) states, init ∈ Q is the initial state, Σ is a finite set of input symbols, Γ is a finite
set of stack symbols, ⊥ ∈ Γ is an auxiliary symbol indicating bottom-of-stack (initially
the DPDA stack consists of one instance of ⊥ and nothing else), and δ is a finite set of
transitions, each of the form
p, Z q, α
where p, q are states, a ∈ Σ ∪ {}, Z ∈ Γ , and α is a finite sequence of stack symbols,
subject to the following restriction:
(1) If Z = ⊥ then α = ⊥β where β ∈ (Γ\{⊥})∗; if Z = ⊥ then α ∈ (Γ\{⊥})∗.
(2) If p, Z q, α and p, Z r, β and a ∈ Σ ∪ {} then q = r and α = β.
(3) If p, Z q, α and p, Z r, β then a = .
Condition (1) ensures that the bottom-of-stack symbol is always present at the bottom of
the stack, but nowhere else. Condition (2) imposes determinism, and Condition (3) enforces
disjointness between a-transitions where a ∈ Σ and -transitions. A DPDA is said to be
real-time just in the case where it has no -transitions.
A configuration of a DPDA is a pair (q, α) where q is a state, and α ∈ Γ ∗, which has
the form⊥β where β ∈ (Γ\{⊥})∗, is the sequence of symbols on the stack. The transitions
of a configuration are defined by the following prefix rule:
If p, Z q, α is a transition in δ then for any γ ∈ Γ ∗, we have p, γ Z q, γ α
(which we read as: by consuming a from the input, and replacing Z on top of the stack by α,
we can go from state p to state q). The transition relation between configurations where
a ∈ Σ is then standardly extended to words where w ∈ Σ∗. Acceptance is by empty
stack. Formally the language recognized by the DPDA P , written L(P), is defined to be
L(P) def= {w ∈ Σ∗ : ∃q ∈ Q.init,⊥ q,⊥}.
That is, L(P) is the set of inputs that P can consume and at the same time empty its stack.
The DPDA Equivalence Problem was first posed in 1966 by Ginsberg and
Greibach [10]:
“Is there an effective procedure for deciding whether any two DPDAs recognize the
same language?”
Restricted to the real-time case, the problem was solved positively by Oyamaguchi
et al. in 1980 [29]. The general decidability problem was only solved recently, also
positively, by Se´nizergues [35] (solution announced in 1997). A simpler proof [37] of the
decidability result, and a primitive recursive complexity bound [38], were subsequently
obtained by Stirling.
C.-H.L. Ong / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 130 (2004) 125–171 157
5.3. Construction of the DPDA P f
Let f be a finite view function that generates an innocent strategy-with-state over a
third-order arena A. We shall construct a real-time DPDA P f that recognizes the complete
plays of the knowing strategy erase (strat( f )). Formally the real-time DPDA
P f = 〈Q f , init,Σ f ,Γ f ,⊥, δ f 〉
is defined as follows:
• The alphabetΣ f consists of all moves of A less third-order questions, and for each third-
order question (3 with view-offset i that appears in the range of f , a symbol representing
the justified question.
• The state-set Q f def= {init} ∪ dom( f ) ∪ {p mS : f (p) = mS}. That is, other than
the initial state, every state is either an (odd-length) P-view in the domain of f , or an
(even-length) P-view that is a section of the graph of f .
• The set Σ f of stack symbols consists of the f -reachable questions of A. An
f -reachable question of A is either an O-question [S whereby p[S ∈ dom( f ) for some
p, or it is a P-view of the form p(S such that f maps p to (S . Clearly Γ f is a finite set.
• The transitions of P f , which are presented in Fig. 6, are organized into four types:
Transition State Before Input State After Stack
Type (P-views) Symbol (P-views) Action
1 odd-length P question even-length push
2 odd-length P answer even-length pop
3 even-length (or init) O question odd-length push
4 even-length O answer odd-length pop
For example a transition p, Z q, α is type-1 just in the case where p is an odd-
length P-view and a is a P-question (q is an even-length P-view, and α = Z Z ′ for some
Z ′, corresponding to a push action on the stack). For ease of reading, we present each
transition p, Z q, α as a block of the form
p Z a q α
in Fig. 6; where appropriate, we shall write a move of order k as mk to aid reading.
Inspecting the four types of transitions in turn, it is straightforward to verify that the
automaton P f thus defined is a real-time DPDA.
5.4. Decidability theorems
The main technical result of this section is the following theorem:
Theorem 31. For any compactly innocent strategy-with-state strat( f ) of a third-order
arena, we have
L(P f ) = cplays (erase (strat( f ))).
Hence, by Theorem 25, the (set of complete plays of the) knowing-strategy semantics of a
third-order finitary IA term is deterministic context-free.
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Fig. 6. Transitions of the DPDA P f .
We first explain the idea behind Theorem 31. The tasks of verifying that an input word
is a (complete) play in erase strat( f ) have been built into the transitions of the DPDA P f .
At any given point during a computation of P f , the state that is reached is precisely the
P-view of that prefix, s say, of the input word which has been read thus far; and the stack
at that point contains the subsequence of (pending) f -reachable questions in s. The stack
actions ensure that the computation admits only moves that observe Well-Bracketing:
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Fig. 7. Transitions of the DPDA (less the stack actions) in Example 32.
• If the prefix s is odd-length, only the P-move mS = f (s) may fire—see transitions
of Types 1 and 2.
• In the case where s is even-length, all legal O-moves m (i.e. those m such that s mS
satisfies O-visibility, Well-Bracketing, and State Change, and so, s mS ∈ dom( f ))
may fire—see transitions of Types 3 and 4.
For a simple example, we consider the DPDA of a state-less view function as follows.
Example 32. Take the term λF.F(λx .x) of type ((o ⇒ o) ⇒ o) ⇒ o, first considered
in the proof of Lemma 30 (we use the notation therein). The transitions (less the stack
actions) of the associated DPDA are shown in Fig. 7. Consider the Type-4.3 transition
marked † which we give in full as follows:
[0 (1 [2 (3 )3 ]2, “[0 (1 [2 (3” [0 (1 [2 (3 )3, .
Note that the P-question to which the input symbol )3 is an answer does not appear in
the state (i.e. P-view) before the transition (it occurs in the segment of the play between
(1 and [2 which does not appear in the P-view); we rely on the information contained
in the “symbol” on the top of stack—“[0(1[2(3” which is the last pending f -reachable
question—to work out the P-view after the move. This is why the stack symbols are
f -reachable questions, rather than simply questions. Indeed this alone is why we need
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pushdown automata (as opposed to just deterministic finite automata) to characterize third-
order strategies.
We first make a few notational remarks.
(i) For any legal position s ∈ strat( f ), we define the subsequence rq s of (pending)
f -reachable questions of s as follows. First set t to be the subsequence of pending
questions of s; rq s is defined to be the sequence which is obtained from t by prefixing4
it by the bottom-of-stack symbol ⊥, and by replacing every occurrence q of a pending
P-question in t by sq, where sq is the prefix of s that terminates at q .
(ii) By definition of P f , the input symbol m of each transition p, Z p′, α is a move
without state. Nevertheless each such m can be given a canonical state, namely, the
state of the last move-with-state of the P-view p′. Suppose init,⊥ p, α; we write ŝ
to be the sequence that is obtained from s by annotating each move with its canonical
state.
Lemma 33. Given a finite view function f so that σ = strat( f ) is an innocent strategy-
with-state:
(i) If s is a legal position in σ then init,⊥ s, rq s where s− = erase s.
(ii) If init,⊥ p, α for some p and α then
(1) ŝ is a legal position in σ ,
(2) ̂s = p,
(3) α = rq s.
Proof. We prove (i) by induction on the length of s ∈ σ . For an illustration, we shall
consider the inductive case of an even-length s[T2 ∈ σ , where [T2 is explicitly justified by
(
S0
1 . Let b
S1 be the last move of s. By condition (SC-O), we have T = S0[S1]. By the
induction hypothesis, we have
init,⊥ s, rq s
where s− = erase s. By Lemma 28(i), (S01 , which is the unique pending first-order ques-
tion in s, appears in s. Hence we may write the even-length s as p(S01 wbS1 where
f : p(S01 w → bS1. By Lemma 28(ii), s and s have the same pending first-order
question (S01 , the unique such in both case. Thus, the following instance of Type 3.2 rule:
p (S01 w b
S1, Z p (S01 [S0[S1]2 , Z [S0[S1]2
is applicable and, hence, we have
init,⊥ s [S0[S1]2 , rq (s [S0[S1]2 )
where s′ = erase (s [S0[S1]2 ) and s [S0[S1]2  = p (S01 [S0[S1]2 as required.
4 We shall show in Lemma 33 that rq s is the sequence of symbols on the stack (at an appropriate point in the
computation of P f ), and by definition such sequences always begin with the symbol ⊥.
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We prove (ii) by induction on the length of the sequence s. The base case of |s| = 1 is
trivial. For the inductive cases, suppose
init,  p, α p′, α′.
The last transition is one of four possible types. We consider the important cases, namely,
Types 3.2 and 4.3, for illustration; the rest are comparatively straightforward.
Type-3.2 transition. The input symbol m is a second-order O-question [2. By the induc-
tion hypothesis (2), we have ̂s = p0 (S01 w bS1, for some odd-length P-view p0, where
(
S0
1 is the unique first-order P-question that appears in p0(
S0
1 w bS1. Thus ŝ [S12 , whereby
the pointer of [S12 is to (S01 , satisfies Visibility, and so is a legal position in σ , which gives
(1), and ŝ [2 = p0(S01 [S0[S1]2 = p′, which is (2) as required. Finally (3) is an immediate
consequence of the induction hypothesis (3).
Type-4.3 transition. We have that m is a third-order O-answer )3. By the induction hypothe-
ses (1) and (2), ŝ is an even-length legal position in σ , and ̂s = p which has the form
p0(
T0
1 [T2 w ]S12 . Thus the last move-with-state of ŝ has state S1. Since p′ = p0(T01 u (S03 )S0[S1]3 ,
m has state S0[S1]; thus ŝ )S0[S1]3 satisfies State Change. The stack α has the symbol
“p0(
T0
1 u (
S0
3 ” on top. By the induction hypothesis (3), “(S03 ” is the last pending P-question.
Since (3 3 )3, we have that ŝ )S0[S1]3 satisfies Well-Bracketing, and hence5 also Visibility.
Therefore we have ŝ )3 = ŝ )S0[S1]3 ∈ σ . The P-view of ŝ )3 is t )S0[S1]3  where t is the
prefix of ŝ that terminates at (S03 . By the induction hypothesis (3), t = p0 (T01 u (S03 , the
top-of-stack symbol. Thus we have ŝ )3 = p0 (T01 u (S03 )S0[S1]3 , which is p′ as required.
Finally to show (3), we observe that α′ is obtained from α by popping the top of stack
symbol, which is exactly right. 
Remark 34. It may have occurred to the reader who has studied the preceding proof that
the prefix p of an f -reachable P-question, p (S , is redundant in the case where the question
is first-order. We have included it in the definition so that first- and third-order P-questions
are treated uniformly when presenting the transition rules of P f .
Take a complete play s ∈ strat( f ). By (i) of the lemma, we have erase s ∈ L(P f )
because rq s = ⊥ and acceptance is by empty stack. Since
erase (cplays (strat( f ))) = cplays (erase (strat( f )))
we have cplays (erase (strat( f ))) ⊆ L(P f ). The opposite inclusion follows from (ii) of
the lemma. Hence, Theorem 31 is an immediate consequence.
Corollary 35. For the same f as before, the following sets are all real-time deterministic
context-free.
(1) Plays of the knowing strategy erase (strat( f )).
(2) Plays of the innocent strategy-with-state strat( f ).
(3) Complete plays of strat( f ).
5 Recall that an O-answer to the last pending question always satisfies the Visibility condition.
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Proof. By straightforward modifications of P f . 
As a corollary of Theorem 31, we have the main result of the paper:
Theorem 36 (Decidability). (i) Observational equivalence of third-order finitary IA
(built up from finite base types) is decidable.
(ii) We refer to the sublanguage of IA without the bad-location construct mkloc as IA−.
Observational equivalence of third-order finitary IA− is decidable.
Proof. (i) Take third-order IA-terms M1 and M2 such that Γ  Mi : A is provable for
some Γ and A. By Theorem 18, their respective innocent strategy-with-state denotations
[[Γ  Mi : A]] (as finite view functions) are computable. By Theorem 31 and since
it is decidable whether any two real-time DPDAs recognize the same language, we
have
“cplays (erase [[Γ  M1 : A]]) = cplays (erase [[Γ  M2 : A]])”
is decidable. Hence, by Theorem 25, we have that
“cplays [[Γ  M1 : A]]κ = cplays [[Γ  M2 : A]]κ”
is decidable. Finally, by Theorem 23, we have that “M1 ≈ M2” is decidable, as required.
(ii) is an immediate consequence of the result, due to McCusker [20], that adding
mkloc to IA− is conservative for observational equivalence (but not for observational
preorder). 
Note that since DPDA INCLUSION (“Given DPDAs M1 and M2, is it the case that
L(M1) ⊆ L(M2)?”) is undecidable, the preceding argument cannot be used to prove that
observational preorder of third-order IA is decidable.
Complexity of DPDA EQUIVALENCE
It is not clear what the complexity of deciding on the observational equivalence of third-
order finitary IA is. Our decision procedure is dominated by the computation of the view-
function denotation of the two IA terms being compared, and by the procedure that decides
equivalence of the two derived real-time DPDAs. The former is in essence a normalization
procedure (which is essentially linear head reduction in the sense of [6]) for a sublanguage
consisting of appropriate canonical forms of third-order finitary IA; the complexity of the
latter is a topic of current research. Stirling has suggested that his algorithm in [39] can be
modified to give an elementary upper bound for deciding on the equivalence of real-time,
strict (i.e. acceptance by empty stack) DPDAs.
Observational equivalence of fourth-order IA is undecidable
Can the algorithmic representation be extended to fourth and higher orders? It turns out
that the third order is the limit, and the best that we can do. By demonstrating that there are
fourth-order terms whose complete plays correspond to runs of Turing-complete machine
models, Murawski [22] has shown that observational equivalence is undecidable for the
fourth-order fragment.
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Deciding observational equivalence of second-order IA
Using the view function approach, we obtain a new proof of a result due to Ghica and
McCusker in [9]:
Theorem 37. The set of complete plays of the knowing-strategy denotation of a second-
order finitary IA term is regular.
Proof. Let f be the view function determined by a second-order finitary IA term. We
consider the various types of transitions of the DPDA P f as set out in Fig. 6. Type-4.3
transitions are not applicable as they are for the case where the input symbol is a third-
order answer. Consequently the pushdown stack is redundant, and the resultant transition
function cuts down to that of a deterministic finite automaton. (See Example 32 for an
explanation of the roˆle played by the pushdown stack in the DPDA determined by a third-
order term.) 
Ghica and McCusker’s result in [9] is for a version of second-order IA that has an
iteration construct in the form of while-loops. We believe that the view function approach
can be used to prove this stronger form of the result. The idea is that the states of the finite
automaton should be regular sets of P-views. IA terms-in-contexts will be compiled to
(finite) evaluation graphs, which will be shown to be the generators of the required sets of
complete plays. Details of this approach will be presented elsewhere.
6. Second-order IA with recursion is undecidable
Ghica and McCusker have shown in [9] that the regular-expression representation of the
knowing-strategy semantics of IA, and hence the decidability of observational equivalence,
applies to second-order finitary IA augmented by iteration in the form of while-loops. Is
observational equivalence still decidable for the same fragment augmented by the fixpoint
operator (so that one can compute fixpoints of terms of order 2)? The answer is no.
Theorem 38 (Undecidability). Assuming that base types are finite, observational
preorder of second-order IA with full recursion (thus admitting recursively defined first-
order functions) is undecidable.
The proof is by an idea due to Jones and Muchnick in [14]. Fix a finite alphabet Σ ,
and consider a programming system called Queue, which has a single memory cell z that
can store a symbol from Σ , a queue (unbounded, first-in–first-out) data structure, and four
instructions as follows: let a ∈ Σ and L ≥ 0 be a label:
(1) enqueue a: write the symbol a ∈ Σ onto the right end of the queue.
(2) dequeue z: if the queue is empty, halt; otherwise remove the leftmost symbol from the
queue and write it to z.
(3) if z = a goto L.
(4) halt.
A Queue program is a finite sequence of the form
1 : I1, 2 : I2, · · ·m : Im
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Fig. 8. Definition of program MP .
Fig. 9. Simulation of the Queue instructions.
where each Ii is an instruction. By simulating Post’s Tag Systems [21] in Queue, the
problem
QUEUE-HALTING: Given a Queue program, will it halt eventually?
can be shown to be undecidable.
Lemma 39. Given a Queue program P, there is an IA program  MP : com (closed term
of type com, which belongs to the fragment of IA in question) that simulates P.
For simplicity, we represent Σ by {1, . . . , N}, for some appropriate N . Given a Queue
program P = 1 : I1, 2 : I2, · · ·m : Im , we define an IA program of the fragment in
question MP in Fig. 8.
For ease of reading we use letrec instead of Y(−), and avail ourselves of case
construct and while-loop. We use three “global variables”: halt , pc (program control),
and z (cell variable of the Queue system) in the simulation. For each Ii in P , we define a
corresponding Ji as a branch of the case-construct, as set out in Fig. 9.
The idea is to simulate the queue data structure by a stack, namely, the call stack of the
recursively defined F , together with a way of marking the position of the head of the queue.
Each “enqueue a” instruction is simulated by a call of F , which declares three variables:
• cur , an assignable variable, is initialized to a, the symbol being added to the queue.
• pre of type loc is bound to the assignable variable cur declared by the calling F .
• w of type loc is bound to the term (ifzero !pre then cur elsew), which evaluates
to the assignable variable cur declared by the F that was called at a recursive depth
corresponding to the current head of the queue.
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During the simulation, the position of the head of the queue is indicated by the highest
stack frame whose local variable cur contains 0, a special symbol not in Σ . The dequeue
instruction is simulated by assigning the contents of cur , that is local to that call of F at
a call-depth corresponding to the current head of the queue, to z; followed by assigning
0 to that cur , thus moving the head of the queue one frame up the stack. The call stack
continues to grow until halt is set to 1, which has the effect of collapsing the call stack, as
one recursive call of F after another exits.
Plainly the IA program MP eventually halts if and only if it is observationally equivalent
to the program skip. Undecidability of observational equivalence for this fragment of IA
then follows from the undecidability of QUEUE-HALTING.
7. Conclusions and further directions
In this paper we have answered the following questions:
(1) Does Ghica and McCusker’s regular-expression representation of second-order IA
extend to the third-order fragment?
No: Lemma 30.
(2) What automata-theoretic formalism is needed to model third-order IA without
recursion? Deterministic context-free languages: Theorem 31.
(3) Is observational equivalence of third-order IA without recursion decidable?
Yes: Theorem 36.
(4) Is observational preorder of second-order IA with full recursion decidable?
No: Theorem 38.
7.1. Some open problems
We intend to investigate applications of this work in Software Model Checking (see
e.g. [27]). (Work in collaboration with Abramsky, Ghica and Murawski at Oxford, and
with Lazic´ at Warwick, is already under way.) In addition to model-checking observational
equivalence which is of basic importance, the same algorithmic representations of program
meanings as are derived in this work can be put to use in verifying a wide range of program
properties of IA and cognate programming languages, and in practice this is where the
interesting applications are most likely to lie. Here we just mention a few specific open
problems and directions of a more foundational nature.
(1) A problem of practical importance is understanding the complexity of deciding the
third-order finitary IA, and extracting a feasible algorithm tailored to the task at hand.
We conjecture that there is an algorithm in elementary time.
(2) We believe that our approach can be used to prove that third-order finitary IA
augmented by iteration (given by e.g. while-loops) is decidable (the idea is that a state
of the corresponding DPDA is a regular set of P-views).
In a related direction, restricted to the second-order fragment, we intend to compare
our approach (which is based on the algorithmic representation of view functions) with
McCusker and Ghica’s (which compiles terms directly to regular expressions or finite
automata by recursion on syntax).
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(3) Our decidability results are for IA terms that are generated from finite base types. In
the presence of infinite data types, the automata representations become infinite, thus
losing their algorithmic properties. Similarly large finite data types are likely to make
the automata infeasible. In the literature on process algebras, problems of this kind are
addressed using symbolic transition graphs ([11,17]). We expect similar approaches to
be fruitful for Algorithmic Game Semantics.
(4) In view of Theorem 38, a natural question to ask is whether observational equivalence
of second-order call-by-value IA augmented by recursion is decidable; a positive
answer would be good news from a model-checking perspective because of the direct
relevance to procedural languages such as C.
(5) Finally it would be very interesting to find out whether the observational equivalence
of (low orders of) Reduced ML is decidable. Reduced ML is a call-by-value PCF
augmented by a statically scoped, dynamically allocated, mutable state, with an
equality test for references—as studied in [30] (see also [36]). Our preferred approach
is by Algorithmic Game Semantics, but to our knowledge, the prior (for this approach)
problem of the existence of a fully abstract game semantics for Reduced ML is still
open.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 14
We first prove two useful lemmas. Let σ and τ be strategies-with-state over arenas
A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C respectively. We assume that both arenas are of order at most three.
Lemma 40. (i) For any u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ), we have
erase u ∈ ISeq(erase σ, erase τ ).
(ii) For any u, v ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ), if erase u = erase v then u = v.
Proof. (i) Take any u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ). By Lemma 11, there is a unique t ∈ τ such that
t  u  (B,C). It follows that erase t = erase (u  (B,C)) = (erase u)  (B,C). That is,
(erase u)  (B,C) ∈ erase τ . Similarly we have
(erase u)  (A, B, b) ∈ erase σ
for each occurrence b of an initial B-move in u.
(ii) We prove u = v by induction on the length of u. The base case is trivial. For
the inductive step, suppose umSnS1, umSnS2 ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ). We aim to prove S1 = S2
by a case analysis of m. Suppose m is a P-move in A ⇒ C . Then nS1 and nS2 are
explicitly justified by the same move in u, say mS00 . By axiom (I3) of composition of
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strategies-with-state, we have S1 = S0[S] = S2. Suppose m is an O-move in component
(B,C). We have S1  L(B,C) = S  L(B,C) = S2  L(B,C). So it remains to prove
that S1  L(B,C) = S2  L(B,C). By axiom (I1) and Lemma 11, for some unique
t ∈ τ , and some unique states R, R1, and R2, we have tnR1  umSnS1  (B,C) and
tnR2  umSnS2  (B,C). Since τ satisfies Determinacy, we have R1 = R2 = R′ (say).
Now tnR′  umSnSi  (B,C) for i = 1, 2. By definition of , we have Si = S〈R′〉. We
omit the other case of m being an O-move in component (A, B, b) as it is similar. 
Lemma 41. For any v ∈ ISeq(eraseσ, erase τ ), there exists u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) such that
erase u = v (thanks to (ii), u is unique).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of v. The base case is trivial. For the
inductive case take v m n ∈ ISeq(eraseσ, erase τ ). By the induction hypothesis, we have
erase (u mS) = v m for some u mS ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ).
Suppose mS is a P-move in A ⇒ C . Let m0 be the move in v that explicitly
justifies n, and let mS00 be the move in u that erases to m0. It suffices to show that
u mS nS0[S] ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) as its erasure is obviously v m n. W.l.o.g. assume that m and
hence n are C-moves. Since u mS ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ), (I1) says that there is some t ∈ τ such that
t (u mS)  (B,C). Let mT00 be the move in t that corresponds to m
S0
0 in u under, and let
mT be the last move of t . We then have t nT0[T ] ∈ τ and t nT0[T ]  (u mS nS0[S])  (B,C).
Thus u mS nS0[S] ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) as required.
Now suppose mS is an O-move in component (B,C) (say). Suppose n in v m n is an
O-move in (say) component (A, B, b), for some occurrence b of an initial B-move in v,
and suppose n is explicitly justified by a0 in v. From the induction hypothesis, we have
s  (u mS)  (A, B, b) for some s ∈ σ , and t  (u mS)  (B,C) for some t ∈ τ ; and it
follows that t nU ∈ τ for some U . Now we have t nU  (u mS)  (B,C) nS〈U 〉. Let aT
be the last move of s, and let aT00 be the move in s that erases to a0 in v; and let a
T ′ and
a
T ′0
0 be the moves in u that erase to a and a0 respectively. By (I3
′) we have s nT0[T ] ∈ σ ;
and it remains to show that s nT0[T ]  (umSnS〈U 〉)  (A, B, b); i.e. we need to show that
T0[T ] ⊆ S.
Take a location l that is defined at aT00 . Suppose T0[T ](l) = l. It is easy enough to show
that l is also defined at S. The tricky part is to show that S(l) = l.
Let mS00 be the move in u that explicitly justifies mS . By Visibility, a0 must appear in
the P-view of v m  (B,C), and so, u mS has the following shape:
· · · b · · · aT
′
0
0 ◦1 · · · •1 ◦2 · · · •2 · · · ◦k · · · •k mS00 · · ·mS
where each •i , which is an O-move in B ⇒ C (for if some • j were an A-move, then it
would follow that mS is an A-move, contradicting our assumption), is explicitly justified by
◦i ; for notational convenience, we set ◦k+1 and •k+1 to be mS00 and mS respectively. Now
a0 must be a second-order O-move of B ⇒ C . By Visibility, we note that each segment
◦i · · · •i has the following shape:
◦i a1u1b1 · · · ari uri bri •i
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where each b j is explicitly justified by a j . We aim to prove the following by induction on i .
Claim
(1) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, l is defined at ◦i and •i .
(2) Suppose there is an O-question [, which is a move of A ⇒ C (C say) in ◦i · · · •i , that
is explicitly justified by some (necessarily first-order) P-question q (say) at which l is
not defined. Then it must be one of the O-questions in a segment of the form
α = ( [ · · · ] · · · [ · · · ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
α0
)
where
(a) ( is a third-order question of C , at which l is defined, and which is explicitly
justified by [′ (say),
(b) each [ in α is explicitly justified by q , and
(c) α is either the whole of ◦i · · · •i , or it is a segment of some u j in ◦i · · · •i .
By (I3), we observe that l is not defined at [′, which must also be explicitly justified by
q .
We claim that l is not defined at any move in the subsegment α0 of α. Hence by
condition (SC-O) the respective states at ( and ) map l to the same value. (The point
is that if there were moves deep inside α0 at which l is defined, then any updates by
them might not be reflected at ) by State Change. Essentially the same point is made
in Remark 8.)
Suppose l is defined at each of ◦1, •1, . . . , ◦i , •i . It follows from (I3′) that l is also
defined at ◦i+1. Now suppose a segment of the form α from (2) occurs in ◦i+1 · · · •i+1.
By induction on the number of times such α-segments occur after a0, it is straightforward
to see that [′ (as defined in (2) above), and hence q , must occur before b, the move that
explicitly justifies a0. Suppose now, for a contradiction, we have
· · · q · · · [′ · · · b · · · aT
′
0
0 ◦1 · · · •1 · · · ◦i+1 · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
u2
( [ · · · ] · · · [ · · · e · · · ] · · · )︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
where e, which must be a P-move of B ⇒ C in component (A, B, b), is the first move,
after ( in the segment α, at which l is defined. Now this means that e is explicitly justified
by some move q ′ (say) which must occur in the segment u2. As ( is explicitly justified by
[′, and e occurs before ( is answered (as the three named moves are in B ⇒ C , we can
take the projection of the above interaction sequence onto B ⇒ C and obtained a legal
position), we obtain a contradiction of Observation 1(ii). Note that l is defined at ), the last
move of α, since l is defined at (. Thus we see that l is defined at •i+1.
On the other hand, if no segment of the form α occurs within ◦i+1 · · · •i+1, then it
follows from (I3) and (I3′) that l is defined in every move in the segment ◦i+1 · · · •i+1, and
so, in particular, it is defined at •i+1.
The upshot of (1) and (2) is that after a0 in the interaction sequence umS , the only moves
at which l is not defined are moves from α0 within segments of the form α. Thus l is not
just defined at S but is mapped to the same value as T0[T ](l). 
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Remark 42. Lemma 41 does not hold if the restriction to order three is removed (as
Observation 1 would fail). For example, take σ and τ as given by
 λ f.new z := 0 in ( f (z := 1 ;0) ; !z) : (exp ⇒ com)⇒ exp
F : (exp ⇒ com)⇒ exp  λH.H F : (((exp ⇒ com)⇒ exp)⇒ exp)⇒ exp.
respectively: the former is a strategy-with-state of order 2, the latter, being an innocent
strategy of order 4, is of course also a strategy-with-state.
We can now prove the theorem. We define erase ISeq(σ, τ ) = {erase u : u ∈
ISeq(σ, τ )}. It suffices to prove
erase (ISeq(σ, τ )) = ISeq(erase σ, erase τ ).
The ⊆-inclusion follows from Lemma 40(i), and the other inclusion follows from
Lemma 41.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 16
Let u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ). We define the core of u, written u, to be the subsequence of u that
is obtained by deleting all segments of the form • · · · ◦ from u, where • is an O-move in
A or C , ◦ is a P-move in A or C , all the intervening moves are in B , and neither • nor ◦
appear in u  (A,C).
We shall omit the proofs of the three lemmas that follow, as they are stateful versions of
those that are used to prove the compositionality of innocent strategies in [19].
Lemma 43. Let u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) and suppose the last move of u is an O-move in component
X. Then u  X = u  X. 
Remark 44. Recall that the definition of u  X depends on Lemma 11, which assumes
that u is an interaction sequence. Now u is not in general an interaction sequence, but we
observe that the same argument in the proof of the lemma can be used to infer that there is a
unique justified t , in which the O-moves do not necessarily satisfy State Change, such that
t  u  X , where t is in the evaluation tree of σX , the strategy-with-state corresponding to
X . Thus we can define u  X to be t.
Since all of the moves of u which occur in A or C come from u  (A,C), it is clear
that we can calculate u from u  (A,C) alone.
Lemma 45. If s = u  (A,C) and t = v  (A,C) such that u, v ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) and
s, t ∈ σ ; τ such that saS = taS, then uaS = vaS. 
Lemma 46. If s = u  (A,C) for some u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ), and saS is an odd-length legal
position of A ⇒ C, then saSbT ∈ σ ; τ if and only if there exist B-moves mS11 , . . . ,mSkk
such that, writing mS00 = aS and mSk+1k+1 = bT , for each i = 0, . . . , k,
(1) h Xmi (um
S0
0 m
S1
1 · · ·mSii  Xmi ) = Ri+1 ,(2) Si+1 = Si 〈Ri+1〉,
in which case, we have saSbT = (uaSmS11 · · ·mSkk bT )  (A,C). 
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We can now prove Theorem 16. Suppose even-length saSbT , t ∈ σ ; τ , and taS is a
legal position of A ⇒ C such that saS = taS. We aim to show that taSbT ∈ σ ; τ .
By definition of σ ; τ , s is witnessed by some u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) (we take the shortest such)
such that there is a unique s− ∈ τ such that s−  u  (B,C), and for each occurrence
b of an initial B-move in u, there is a unique sb ∈ σ such that sb  u  (A, B, b);
similarly t is witnessed by v ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ). Since saSbT ∈ σ ; τ , by Lemma 46, there
exist B-moves mS11 , . . . ,m
Sk
k satisfying conditions (1) and (2) therein such that saSbT =
(uaSmS11 · · ·mSkk bT )  (A,C). Since saS = taS, Lemma 45 tells us that uaS = vaS .
By Lemmas 43 and 46, and setting mS00 = aS and mSk+1k+1 = bT for notational brevity, we
have for each i = 0, . . . , k,
h Xmi (um
S0
0 m
S1
1 · · ·mSii  Xmi ) = Ri+1 (B.1)
using the fact that uaSmS11 · · ·mSkk = uaSmS11 · · ·mSkk . But since uaS = vaS , we can
substitute v for u in Eq. (B.1), and use Lemmas 43 and 46 again. We need to check
that condition (2) of the lemma remains valid after the substitution. Thus we deduce that
taSbT = vaSmS11 · · ·mSkk bT  (A,C). 
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